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COURT OF APPEALS JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals over (a) appeals from the Circuit Courts (e) appeals 
from any Court of record in criminal cases. (Section 78-2A-3d) 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Point #1: Did the Circuit Court have phenery jurisdiction to adjudicate this 
case? After Kynaston, the Defendant, demanded that Bountiful City prove its 
jurisdiction. 
Point #2: Did the Bountiful Circuit Court lawfully arraign and try Don R. 
Kynaston without procedural due process. 
Point #3: Can the Bountiful City Prosecutor harass the Defendant and order 
the Bountiful City Police to harass the Defendant? 
Point #4: Can the Trial Judge sentence the Defendant Don R. Kynaston to the 
County Jail without defense counsel present? 
Point #5: Can a legislative creation such as the Department of Safety Drivers 
License Division take away a person's driver's privilege or right to drive 
without procedural due process as described in the 5th and 14th Amendments? 
Point #6: Under Common Law, can there be a crime if there is no intent, no 
injury, no damage or negligence? 
Point #7: Is the Davis County Sheriff's Department responsible for the 
hospital and medical bills incurred by a jailed inmate while that inmate is in 
custody of the County Sheriff, because of poor jail conditions and following 
brutal treatment? 
.4 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
4th Amendment: 
ARTICLE IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, nouses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
5th Amendment: 
ARTICLE V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand 
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the 
Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private 
property be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
6th Amendment: 
ARTICLE VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defense. 
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Constitution of the United State, Cont. 
14th Amendment: 
ARTICLE XIV 
Section I. All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall 
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
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RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). p See Addendum 
In that connection, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1966, 
provided in Rule 44(a): 
DEFINITIONS: amended in 1966, provide in Rule 44(a): 
Personal Liberty p 
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, (1914) P. 1965 
Procedural Due Process p 
5th Amendment, U.S. Constitution p 5 
14th Amendment, U.S. Constitution p 6 
Harassment, Title 18 15 U.S.C.A. Section 1514 p 15 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal case, based on the allegations that the Appellant 
alleged violated certain provisions of the Bountiful City Traffic Code 41-2-
136 and 41-6-117 and 41-6-150, civil statutes mysteriously now becoming a 
crime, (a misdemeanor) and a criminal action. 
The Appellant was stopped, arrested, and booked in the Davis County Jail 
allegedly for failing to appear in Circuit Court, Salt Lake City, for 
allegedly driving under suspension of driver's license, having been suspended 
in 1985. Title 41, U.C.A. Suspension of Driving (privilege) was done 
unlawfully in violation of procedural due process, Clauses 5th Amendment, 14th 
Amendment, U.S. Constitution. 
Course of the Proceedings 
The Appellant was stopped by a Bountiful City Police, Julie Wilcox, on 
the evening of July 7, 1990 at approximately 1:45 p.m. Wilcox used the 
pretense that Kynaston appeared to be driving under the influence. In 
reality, Kynaston was trying to avoid perceived potholes that had been present 
on 400 North for months and a rainbird shooting out into the streets. 
However, the real reason Kynaston was stopped was because Russell Mahan, 
City Prosecutor, had ordered the Bountiful City Police to look for a blue 
Camero with an old gray-haired man driving that Camero and stop that vehicle 
and harass him, and to check for a driver's license. 
Don Kynaston was stopped, asked for his driver's license, which he could 
not produce even though Kynaston had tried to get one and through some 
technical problems, he had not yet received it. 
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Course of the Proceedings, Cont. 
The Appellant was arrested, not given his right (Miranda), the vehicle in 
which he was driving was searched without permission, and without a Fourth 
Amendment warrant, and certain property disappeared. Kynaston was booked and 
jailed, and was released under appearance bond in the morning of July 8, 1990. 
Kynaston appeared in Bountiful, Circuit Court on July 23, 1990 for 
arraignment, without Counsel because he could not afford one. Kynaston asked 
Judge S. Mark Johnson if this was a criminal action. He said "Yes, this was a 
criminal action." The trial was set for July 28, 1990. Kynaston declared 
that his rights were being violated. 
On July 23, 1990, the Appellant sent Letter #1 to S. Mark Johnson and 
appealed to the Judge to take a neutral stance in this matter and asked the 
Court seeking protection from the excessive zeal of corporation government 
(Bountiful City) and requiring the Corporate Plaintiff in a criminal action to 
prove in its personam criminal jurisdiction over the Accused, to be a fact of 
law before the Court (Bountiful City Court) would take on the role of judging 
the fact of law before that of this legislative charge brought before the 
trial Judge Johnson. The Appellant was asking for a preliminary hearing. 
On August 1990, the Accused sent S. Mark Johnson a second letter 
demanding his rights guaranteed Sua Sponte. The Judge ignored both letters. 
The fact that demand was made for the corporate entity to prove its 
jurisdiction, these demands were ignored completely. 
On July 28, 1991, the trial was started and the Accused motioned the 
Court to dismiss the charges because 1) the rights of the Accused had been 
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Course of the Proceedings, Cont. 
denied procedural due process 2) no preliminary examination 3) that the trial 
Judge was prejudiced 4) that there was no Counsel for defense 5) that the 
Defendant demanded corporate Bountiful City to prove its jurisdiction over the 
Defendant. Kynaston submitted an Affidavit of Prejudice against S. Mark 
Johnson and the trial process with testimony containing by Julie Wilcox. 
The trial adjourned for lunch and was resumed about 3:00 p.m. The Trial 
Judge decided to have a continuance until another Judge could decide on the 
Affidavit of Prejudice. 
The trial resumed on September 11, 1990 with the testimony of Julie 
Wilcox, police office for Bountiful, testifying that she did not have to have 
probable cause. The Trial Judge neyer asked any questions to the Defendant 
whether he wanted help or needed Counsel and proceeded without Counsel for the 
defense. 
The Defendant could not and did not have sufficient legal training to 
defend himself against the adversaries, and the Trial Judge proved his 
prejudice against the Accused by his actions. Kynaston was entitled to have 
Counsel at the onset of July at the arraignment, on July 23, 1990 and at the 
trial and sentencing on July 28 and September 11, 1990. 
The Judge knew that Kynaston was entitled to Counsel, because of the 
Judge's experience and knowledge in criminal trials and because the Judge's 
Benchbook was only two feet away from his eyes and nose. Any mistakes the 
Judge made was because of prejudice and his determination to send Kynaston to 
jail. 
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DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT 
On the 11th of September, 1990 following Kynaston's Objection to the 
trial, the Defendant was sentenced to thirty-two days in Davis County Jail. 
The Defendant pleaded to the Judge not to send him to jail, but S. Mark 
Johnson would not listen. 
Kynaston was arrested following the trial, handcuffed and transported to 
Davis County Jail, booked and incarcerated. 
The prisoner Kynaston was told in jail to remove his street clothes and 
put on jail clothes. Kynaston refused to remove his priesthood garments. Kim 
Oliverson said, "If you don't take 'em off, we'll do it for you." Kynaston 
still refused. At that time the jail guard, Kim Oliverson, brutalized 
Kynaston by pushing Kynaston down in the shower stall. This action started 
considerable stress to Kynaston with headaches and fear. 
At 4:00 p.m. Kynaston asked Kim Oliverson for his glipazide to control 
his diabetes. Kynaston asked a second time for his medication, and was 
refused a second time at about 6:00 p.m. At 9:00 p.m., Kynaston asked Kim 
Oliverson for the jail doctor because he was feeling unbalanced and dizzy. He 
was refused medical help. 
At about 10:00 p.m., Kynaston started to suffer from shortness of breath. 
Pains in his arms, shoulders, jaw and pain in his chest. Kynaston called for 
a guard who called for' the jail E.M.T., who called the County Paramedics. 
They examined Kynaston, and the Paramedics administered Morphine, called 
Lakeview Emergency Room, and were told to transport the patient Kynaston to 
the Emergency Room at Lakeview Hospital, still in custody. 
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Disposition at Trial Court, Cont. 
Kynaston was delivered to Lakeview Emergency Room and was examined by 
William T. Saddler, M.D. and was taken to the Intensive Care Unit. Kynaston 
spent six days in Intensive Care and Recovery Care. 
Kynaston was released and returned to Davis County Jail to pick up his 
property. He was again locked up for about one hour. 
The Judge issued an order to Kynaston to present himself to Davis County 
Jail to serve the remainder of his jail sentence. Kynaston was still 
suffering from angina, shortness of breath and vertigo. 
Judge S. Mark Johnson rescinded his recommended Order when a letter from 
Dr. Saddler told Johnson that incarceration might be fatal to Kynaston if he 
were jailed again. According to the record, Kynaston was in custody of Davis 
County Sheriff during all of this time. 
The medical and hospital charges and bill for Dr* William R. Saddler 
amounted to over $6,600.00. The Davis County Sheriff's Department has refused 
to pay the full amount for these services, dumping over $1,090.00 on the 
Defendant, claiming Kynaston was released from custody after the fourth day of 
hospital confinement. However, the Defendant was locked up for about one hour 
and confined again when he returned to recover his property. No one informed 
Mr. Kynaston that he was no longer in custody. 
The fact is that Judge S. Mark Johnson, Russell Mahan, Julie Wilcox and 
the Davis County Jail created all of this hell and health problems for 
Kynaston. 
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STATEMENT OF FACT 
1. Kynaston was stopped, not based on articulated objective fact. 
2. Kynaston has been denied due process since 1985, suspension of his 
driver's license, 5th and 14th Amendments. 
3. Kynaston was tried for a crime when Bountiful City lacked proper 
jurisdiction, having been challenged. 
4. Kynaston was denied Counsel by S. Mark Johnson when required by the Sixth 
Amendment, Argersinger, Utah Supreme Court and the Judge's Benchbook. 
5. Kynaston's stop was an unlawful arrest and unlawful search. 
6. Kynaston suffered severe punishment, damage to his reputation, to his 
finances, to his health by brutal treatment while incarcerated in the 
Davis County Jail. 
7. Kynaston is being charged with the hospital and medical bills during 
confinement. 
8. Kynaston did not commit any crimes. 
9. Kynaston was entitled to Defense Counsel by Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, 1966. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
This case was tried against the Defendant in an atmosphere of harassment 
and denial of due process from start to finish. The Defendant Kynaston 
challenged the authority of Bountiful City by two letters to Judge S. Mark 
Johnson (see letters marked 1 and 2). The Trial Judge is required by law to 
challenge the jurisdiction of Bountiful. He did not. 
"Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven, Hagens vs. Levine," 
415, U.S. 533. (For corpus delicti.) 
Under Common law, there is no crime if three conditions are not present: 
1. Intent. 
2. Damage to property or injury of a person. 
3. Negligence. 
Bountiful City could not prove any of these conditions. 
68-3-1. Common Law Adopted. 
The common law of England so far as it is not repugnant to, or 
in conflict with, the constitution or laws of the United States, or 
the constitution or laws of this state, and so far only as it is 
consistent with and adapted to the natural and physical conditions 
of this state and the necessities of the people hereof, is hereby 
adopted, and shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this 
state. 
Common Law cannot be lawfully derogated by any legislation because Common 
Law is the basis of all ancient laws, the Talmud, the Ten Commandments, the 
Common Law of Northern Europe, the English Magna Carta and our federal 
Constitution. 
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Summary of the Arguments, Cont. 
State and Bountiful Statutes 41-2-136 and 41-2-150 are Civil Statutes. 
It is immoral and unlawful to use Civil Statutes as evidence of the law in a 
criminal action. 
HARASSMENT 
Mr. Kynaston has been a victim of gross harassment on this matter. In a 
earlier case concerning the driver's licence issue, the Defendant was harassed 
by the Bountiful City Prosecutor when Kynaston was seeking a status of 
Impecunity in Layton's Second Circuit Court. Having been notified and ordered 
to appear in that Court by the Judge, Russell Mahan, Bountiful City 
Prosecutor, went out of his way to argue against Kynaston's right to receive 
impecunity status. 
At the end of this hearing, Russell Mahan harassed Mr. Kynaston by 
threatening and harassing him if he drove a car. Mahan threatened Kynaston by 
calling the Layton City Police to have Kynaston arrested and jailed if 
Kynaston drove. Mahan further harassed Kynaston by going up and down 
Kynaston's home street and asking Kynaston's neighbors personal questions 
about his personal life and his finances. The harassment continued. 
Mahan also investigated the property records of Kynaston at the Davis 
County Courthouse and the local banks. Mahan went out of his way by calling 
the Bountiful City Police to be on the lookout for a blue 1975 Camero and to 
stop and harass the driver. 
Mr. Russell Mahan told the Defendant in his office that he was going to 
order Bountiful City Police to harass Mr. Kynaston and threaten him with 
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Detail of the Arguments, Cont. 
arrest and jail and do other things of a harassing nature. Russell Mahan, all 
this time knew that Kynaston was attempting to get a driver's license. 
The true reason Mr. Kynaston was stopped on the night of July 7, 1990 was 
because of harassment ordered by Bountiful City Prosecutor and over-zealous 
Russell Mahan, and not because Mr. Kynaston had committed a real crime. 
On the day of the trial of this matter, Russell Mahan ordered the 
Bountiful City Police to follow the Defendant around Bountiful at lunch break. 
Mr. Mahan threatened Mr. Kynaston several times of arrest and jail if Mr. 
Kynaston drove. 
Harassment Title 18 U.S.C.A. Section 1514. 
Term is used in a variety of legal contexts to describe words, 
gestures and actions which tend to annoy, alarm and abuse (verbally) 
another person; e.g., the use of "Obscene or profane language or 
language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or 
reader" is unlawful harassment under the Federal Fair Debt 
Collection Practices Act. 15 U.S.C.A. Section 1692(d)(2). 
Sexual harassment by employers against employees is recognized 
as a cause of action under Title VII of the Oral Rights Act of 1964, 
42 U.S.C.A. Section 2000e et seq., e.g., Tomkins v. Public Service 
Electric & Gas Co., C.A.N.J., F.2d 1044. 
A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass 
another, he: (1) makes a telephone call without purpose of 
legitimate communication; or (2) insults, taunts or challenges 
another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly 
response; or (3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at 
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Detail of the Arguments, Cont. 
extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively course language; or 
(4) subjects another to an offensive touching; or (5) engages in any 
other course of alarming conduct servicing no legitimate purpose of 
the actor. Model Penal Code, Section 250.4. 
Judge S. Mark Johnson and Russell Mahan were determined to get Kynaston 
convicted and jailed, regardless of how many of Kynaston's civil rights were 
violated. Both Judge S. Mark Johnson and Russell Mahan knew that Kynaston 
would be convicted and sentenced to jail before the trial ever started. Both 
Johnson and Mahan knew or should have known that Kynaston was entitled to: 
1. Preliminary hearing 
2. Discovery 
3. Counsel at time of arraignment 
4* Counsel at trial 
5. Counsel at sentencing 
more commonly known as due process. 
Ignorance of the law is not excuse. Violation of the Defendant's rights 
is no excuse. Both Judge Johnson and Mahan knew that Judge Johnson was 
required to inform the Defendant of his rights before the trial proceeded—and 
he failed to do it. 
Judge's Benchbook Checklist 
5. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
A person accused of a crime has the right to be assisted by counsel in 
his defense. The accused may waive his right, but he must do so 
intelligently, competently, and without coercion. The court must protect the 
defendant in this regard. If the right to counsel is waived, the accused may 
represent himself, subject to the rules of criminal procedure. 
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Detail of the Arguments, Cont. 
When a person is financially unable to retain an attorney and does not 
waive his right, the court must appoint an attorney for him. The court is ncrt 
obligated to appoint an attorney whom the accused requests, but the judge must 
be satisfied that the assigned counsel is competent to handle the defense. A 
conviction may be reversed if the action of the appointed counsel reduces the 
trial to a sham. 
5.1 Right to Counsel 
In criminal prosecutions the defendant has the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel. 
Utah Const., art I, sec. 12. 
See also Rules of Crim. Proc. sec. 77-35—8. 
and 
Upon arraignment, except in case of an infraction, a defendant 
must be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel 
in open court. The defendant must not be required to plead until he 
has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel. 
Rules of Crim. Proc, sec. 77-35-11(a) 
and 
5.2 No Imprisonment When No Counsel 
Absent knowing and intelligent waiver, no person 
imprisoned for any offense, whether misdemeanor or felony, 
represented by counsel. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,92 S.Ct. 
2006, 32 L. Ed., 2d 530 (1972) 
may be 
unless 
and 
5.3 Fundamental Right to Counsel 
The privilege of an accused to the assistance of counsel is a 
fundamental right. It means the right to a reputable member of the 
bar who is willing and in a position honestly and conscientiously to 
represent the interests of the defendant. 
State v. Hines, 6 Utah 2d 126, 307 P.2d 887, Mrrmrr.— 
and 
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Detail of the Arguments, Cont. 
5.4 Advise that Court Will Appoint If Needed 
A court must advise a defendant that if he cannot obtain counsel 
through his own resources the court will provide counsel for him. 
It may not accept a waiver of counsel unless the accused understands 
that representation may be obtained even though he or she lacks 
financial resources. 
Nielsen v. Turner, 287 F. Supp. 116, 121, 122 
(d. Utah 1968). 
See also Rules of Crim. Proc, sees. 
77-35-7(a)(4)(iii) and 77-35-lHa) 
Both Mahan and Judge Johnson knew that Kynaston was financially unable to 
hire a lawyer at $100.00 per hour. Mahan was in attendance at a hearing in 
Second Circuit Court of Layton City when Judge Parley R. Baldwin heard 
arguments from the Defendant asking the Court to grant Kynaston impecunious 
status. Judge Baldwin did that. Nielsen was appointed to appeal that 
particular case. At Court, Judge S. Mark Johnson NEVER EVEN ASKED if 
Defendant needed Counsel. 
This entire miscarriage of justice started in 1984 when Kynaston was 
involved in an accident at 600 North and 700 East when Kynaston ran into a 
vehicle, causing considerable damage to the other vehicle. The other driver 
failed to yield the right of way to Kynaston's vehicle. Kynaston received an 
accident report and the other driver received a ticket for failure to yield. 
Kynaston filed the accident report, which included his insurance carrier. 
Somehow the report was lost or misplaced. Kynaston has never received 
notification of a hearing. Kynaston received a notice that his driver's 
license had been suspended for lack of financial responsibility before any 
hearing. 
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Detail of the Arguments, Cont. 
Through research, Kynaston discovered that he was entitled to a hearing 
prior to losing his privilege of driving a motor vehicle. Through further 
research he discovered that several other of his rights had been disallowed. 
Kynaston has received several tickets, has been fined, jailed and has 
been deprived of due process and harassed for six years. 
1. Kynaston was deprived of his driver's privilege without procedural due 
process as required in the Fifth and Fourteen Amendments. 
2. Bountiful City never proved its jurisdiction when demanded from the 
Defendant. 
3. The arresting officer, Julie Wilcox, commits perjury in open Court by 
denying she needed probable cause. 
4. Russell Mahan and Bountiful police unlawfully harassed Defendant. 
5. Bountiful City police unlawfully searched Defendant's vehicle without 
permission or a Fourth Amendment warrant. 
6. Bountiful City police unlawfully arrested the Defendant without giving 
him the Miranda warning. 
7. Judge S. Mark Johnson failed to give the Defendant protection from 
corporate zealots like Russell Mahan, et al. (Bountiful City). 
8. Judge S. Mark Johnson failed to protect Kynaston's Constitutional and 
civil rights by not informing Kynaston of his rights. 
9. Judge S. Mark Johnson unlawfully arraigned, tried and sentenced Kynaston 
to thirty-two days in the Davis County Jail, without benefit of Defense 
Counsel, even after Kynaston objected to all of the proceedings, claiming 
his rights were being violated and being over-ruled by the Judge. 
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10. Judge S. Mark Johnson tried and sentenced the Defendant after Kynaston 
claimed the Judge was prejudiced against Kynaston, disregarding an 
Affidavit of Prejudice filed against S. Mark Johnson. 
11. Kynaston, the Defendant, was brutalized in the Davis County Jail, denied 
his medical prescription, denied help and medical assistance from the 
Jail doctor, and suffered personal humiliation from Jail guards. 
12. Kynaston was in full custody of the Davis County Sheriff, even though the 
Defendant was confined in Intensive Care most of the time. 
13. The Defendant Kynaston has suffered permanent, extensive damage to his 
health as a result of the unlawful acts of Bountiful City, Russell Mahan, 
Bountiful Police Department and Judge S. Mark Johnson. 
14. Kynaston continues to suffer from angina, shortness of breath, headaches, 
weakness and nausea. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Petitioner concludes by simply asking the court to rectify the wrongs 
perpetrated by the government which appears to, in some areas, becoming 
despotic. 
It is the belief of the Petitioner that it is important that from time to 
time we return to the fundamental principles that made this nation so great 
and reflect on the past and to be aware of the direction we are going. 
21 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Defendant asks this Honorable Court to reverse the guilty judgment 
rendered by the Bountiful Second Circuit Court. 
Issue a permanent Restraining Order against S. Mark Johnson, Bountiful 
City, Russell Mahan and Bountiful police from harassing the Defendant and 
his family. 
Compensate the Defendant for the time and expense and suffering to the 
Defendant and to his family. 
Order the Davis County Sheriff to pay all medical and hospital costs 
incurred by the Defendant. 
Order Bountiful City to pay Petitioner's attorney's fees for all costs of 
preparing his defense and cost of appeal. 
Order disciplinary measures to all of those responsible for the 
miscarriage of justice in this case. 
Order the Driver's License Division of the Department of Public Safety 
Commission to "GET THEIR HORSE BEFORE THEIR CART" by complying to demands 
and orders of the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell vs. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 
1971 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
"Serious consequences also may result from convictions not 
punishable by imprisonment. Losing one's driver's license 
is more serious for some individuals than a brief stay in 
jail. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), we said: 
'Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their 
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit 
of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus 
involves state action that adjudicates important interests 
of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to 
be taken away without that procedural due process required 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.'" Id., at 539. 
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Relief Sought, Cont. 
The Fourteenth Amendment of The Constitution of the United States of 
America States: 
"Section I. All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
8. The Petitioner also asks this Honorable Court to reverse all of the 
unlawful convictions issued against the Defendant caused by the lack of 
due process administered by the Driver's License Division Utah Public 
Safety Commission. 
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ADDENDUM PART 
Dr R. KYNASTON 
5l<. North 750 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 jfr 
' I 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT, CITY OF BOUNTIFUL A,, £ 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH o, 'UG 0 o 
^At* ^8 'O 
AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE ^ 
Case No. 9022886 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON R. KYNASTON, 
Accused. 
00O00 
COMES NOW the Accused, Don R. Kynaston, and hereby demands that S. Mark 
Johnson, Judge in the Second Circuit Court, recuse himself from this action or 
any other action concerning the Accused because he has shown extreme prejudice 
in this case and in former actions where this Accused person was denied due 
process of law, unlawfully jailed and unlawfully fined. 
The Accused declares that this Court and Judge Johnson are in violation 
of Article 7, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and in violation of Utah 
Code of Criminal Procedure 77-32 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5), 77-32-2, 77-32-3, 77-32-4, 
77-32-5, 77-32-6, 77-32-7 and 77-35-8, 77-35-16(B). 
The Accused also declares that S. Mark Johnson was in violation of 
Section 12^ Utah State Constitution when in a former case he tried to 
unlawfully force the Accused to post a $500.00 bond before the Accused could 
appeal a conviction in his Court based on an unlawful trial. 
It is not the prerogative of any Court or Judge of the same to assume 
anything. Courts must rely on facts or testimony before any ruling, and is 
clearly forbidden by law to assume anything to be fact before moving forward 
to set trial or any procedure. 
I h e r e f o r e , t h e A c c u s e d D o n K j n a s t o r i p e t i 1i o n s t h i s C o u r t o r 
Constitutional due process from the arraignment on for ward (Sua Sponte), 
Therefore, tl le Accused petitions those in authority to appoint: a neutr al 
Supreme Court k itl i a Wr it of Pr ohibition ti :> ii iter ver le and take this matter to 
a competent court for further disposition. 
Si ibn n'tted tl Ms ^ ^ z t da ) o I ' ^ ^ ^ ^ _, 1990, 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON R. KYNASTOj 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of the 
AFFIDAVIT OF PREJUDICE this ^ / ^ T d a y o f ^ ^ ^ ^ g ^ , 1990. 
Stu* JtfsC''"lA~ir -'±\ ,--<—6'.<'"£>J'""S ^ ^ ;6 -Me™ -U f ^
 t; * A /I A ^UuU 
' * ' / % • 
/cA 
^ E D E N D U M 7 * ? . " " 2 
• - •• Ju !y 30 , 1990 
Honorable S. Mark Johnson 
745 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utal i 84010' , . . " ' ' /.' 
Dear Judge Johnson: 
Wl lei i I appeared befor e yoi it Court on 23r d o1 ' July, 1990 on a forced 
response to a bill of pains and penalties, Citation No, B779798 issued by 
Officer Julie Wilcox, employed by Bountiful City, Davis County, State of Utah., 
I move this Court to take judicial notice, that my appearance was forced, and 
that my appearance is special f his notice is my timely objection to the 
presumptions upon which a false conclusion of law has been made 
administratively with regard to my status before this Court. The Plaintiff in 
this case is an administrative officer in Bountiful City, State of Utah which 
has legislative power to compel performance on the letter of its statutes upon 
all persons subject to its jurisdiction. The only due process that these 
legislative tribunals recognize is that the accused, only has the right to be 
heard on the facts of the case. The Corporate Plaintiff in this action before 
this Court has made an unproven conclusion of law that Don R. Kynaston is 
among those persons who have los t their status in the Republic and must 
perform under legislative power upon the exact letter of eyery legislative 
statute, with no due process of law or protection other than that outlined in 
paragraph two of this letter. It is from this false conclusion of law that 
Administrative Officer Julie Wilcox isssued the contested bill of pains and 
penalties upon Don R. Kynaston in this case, 
Judicia ! Notice must be taken by this Court that Don R. Kynaston, an 
unenfranchised individual, has made a contrary conclusion of law to that of 
the Plaintiff. He claims guaranteed rights stemming from both the Federal and 
State Constitutions to full due process of law in all criminal actions against 
him, which means that he is subject only to judicial power not legislative 
power, and said judicial power when exercised over him requires a Corpus 
Delicti, or damaged party who has sworn out a complaint against him. This is 
lacking in the case brought on by Plaintiff, so the Accused declares that his 
unenfranchised status as a citizen of the Republic known as the United States 
of America and a dweller in the State of Utah. Without a Corpus Delicti or 
damaged party, no court, judicial or legislative, has a criminal jurisdiction 
over this person. Therefore, the Accused appeared before the law side of this 
Court seeking its protection from the excessive zeal of Corporation 
government, ^ust^ng that this Court would assume a neutral stance at law and 
require the Corporate Plaintiff in the criminal action to prove its in 
personam criminal jurisdiction over the Accused, to be a fact of law before 
this Court would take ?r the r- "U- -f .judc^y the fact of tnis legislative 
charge brought before 
Respect, f-j" 
•*' *y tz*^L~*f> ,-•* ^L..-' 
Don R. Kynaston 
512 North 750 East 
B o u n t 4 r V "t.^ s 
s ^T>2S^L4^ 
<0fc~-^^h 
! |J ig j . > ; , • A D D E N D U M P A R T 3 
Honorable S. Mark Johi 
745 South Main Street 
Bountiful, l't~h ^ r v -
Dear Judge u nn 
This letter will grant you the opportunity to study your file to the 
numbered case 9022886, that you have threatened the liberty and/or property of 
this person, made in hast from the equity side of your court. You acted 
without a lawful jurisdiction. As you know or should know, a judge at law 
performs in a manner quite different from a Chancellor in equity. Undoubtedly 
you have sat so long as a Chancellor in equity that you have lost sight of 
your alternate position as a judge at law, and you may be unaware of your duty 
to function and act in that capacity, but you are requested to do so on 
constitutional issues. It is within your alternate duty to function as a 
judge at law. Your contract of employment required you to swear an oath to 
obey, defend and protect the Federal and Utah State Constitutions, recognizing 
them as the supreme law of the land when you assume the role as judge at law. 
Your failure to recognize the Constitution as the "supreme law of the land 
following your oath of office disenfranchises you as a judge at law and makes 
you an individual open to charges of perjury for having made a false oath. 
.Now to tl le case in point, since a controversy of law existed between a 
public servant, Officer Wilcox, and employed by Bountiful City, Davis County, 
State of Utah. It involved the rights guaranteed to all citizens of this 
Republic by the supreme law of the land, which law is above every legislative 
statute. I, Don R. Kynaston, wrote you a specific letter regarding contrary 
conclusions of law in this case requesting you to appear on the law side of 
your court, asking for your protection as a judge at law from the excessive 
zeal of the Corporate government wherein said government brings on a criminal 
action under a legislative equity jurisdiction where Constitutional rights are 
ignored and legislative statutes become the supreme law of the legislative 
courts. This is contrasted with the judicial court in what constitutes due 
process of law. 
Legislative equHj can be a lawful jurisd>cti-j . 1: -•<[.•[, :^s primarily to 
corporate entities and the individuals who are under contract with government, 
which contract usually takes the form of a franchise of one form or another. 
It might also be a jurisdiction presumed to be lawful to those that do not 
timely and specifically object to it on constitutional grounds. The presumed 
lawfulness of this legislative jurisdiction in equity in personam ends however 
the moment it is objected to on constitutional grounds. The above should have 
been recognized by you from my letter in yoi ir file dated August 8, 1990. 
You shou Id ! lave responded from the law side of your court. i our 
jurisdiction is here established while you lacked any jurisdiction in equity 
when I requested your presence on the law side to hear a constitutional issue, 
which you must do before taking up an .issue of fact on the equity side. 
In it » 'espoi iding to the law side of your cour t, the Federal ..- . :. ...-it-
Constitutions which are the supreme law of the land set the tone of your 
response, and form the basis of any judgment which you make. You are then 
sitting as a judge at law, which is as much your duty as sitting as fiance" ;or 
in equity under the legislative side of your duty. Since jurisdiction in 
equity is lacking at this time for you, and can only be established when ond 
if the Plaint:ft in this case enters the law side of your court. With ,-JU 
sitting as a neutral judge at law and by Plaintiff placing in evidence a valid 
contract of franchise which proves a fact of law that the accused Don R. 
Kynaston is under contract obligation as a franchised individual to obey every 
legislative statue upon the letter of the statute, having lost h-~ n n h p a " 
rights under the constitution f ^ ^ " ^ ^ ^ * c ,.,^e^ T?4-ie 49 ucr 
Wit! 1 such proof on the recoro or the law side or your court, y~u could 
then enter the equity side as Chancellor in legislative equity w u n proven 
authority or jurisdiction to issue orders such as you did on July 23, 1990 to 
me. My failure to perform cou'H t*e*-. ^^-.11. -v .m arrest warrant a^ :i ja : 
a contempt of court charge. 
With the above information in my file, and a copy of this letter, which 
wiII also be filed with the Clerk of the Court, I feel you will take notice of 
your employment contract and act accordingly from the law side of your court, 
voiding your form letter dated July 23, 1990, wherein from the equity side you 
ordered me to appear and * ^ ^ ^ w ~ , ,„ u e rjt.,rr* +.. -^  __..., r... _ n, r 
contempt of court charge. 
I! you f a n to correct your order wherein you iacK jurisdiction and 1 am 
arrested and jailed, my legal remedy for an order given without legal 
jurisdiction is H* •; conin^?. law W<*t of Prohibition against your .rder <xr\o 
filing a complaint against you personally as an individual. Your acts outside 
of your lawful authority to act will have caused unlimited damage to my 
person, property and my reputation ^ having spent time in jail or prisoi 
will press that complaint to the fullest extent of the law, since your 
unlawful act will have been willful in view ^f thp nntirp n-u/pr *.-. wn; in ±-r_u. 
letter. 
1 w i 1 1 wa; * .•-.-': •.;,•,
 ; ^ . ;-ts oc liwii Tor f: vt days before x —•-... o 
Writ of Prohibition -n trie Federal :"ourt and have pending law suits and civil 
rights v i o l a t e s brought against you *or just cause. 
Respectfu i 
Don R. Kynastort 
512 North 750 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that i sent a true and correct copy of the letter dated 
August 8, 1990 to Honorable S. Mark Johnson and Clerk of the Court this 
2-L day of y ^ 1990. 
Don R. Kynaston 
ADDENDUM PART 4 
Fred C. Sw ind imar i 
Department of Public Safety 
Office of Drivers License Servut-s 
Financial Responsibility Seat 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah M l i'"J" 
Ft """"ic "1 r-d Petition for Hear inq 
^1-443419 
Dear M*- Swindiman: 
r./rdston, ce r * : \ \ V az :.r,f statemeti •:« -1- ^HIH^ the penalties of 
perjury is t f j e and correct •? * ^;:^Pi-* . i - . : - +. * c:
 5<r ir f i c t i t i o u s in 
any *a* * *( content 
1 .,;, ,;ut . i.aii •• JI r~+ ^w" ' « " veHr1* 
2. That Don - ^ast.'- na lever -.t., - ar ac.idP't wnk:; respite :r. rersonal 
injury or damage t:. anr.tu- ***- ^ - , r ^ r t 
3. h'r\at Dor .v*dv - *^: i ^pgui^en ircidpnt report acco*'::^ ;:> 
law A • • TV <e- ! .*- ss.-it •
 fc*our ^ f ^ u , uateo Mr^-.ane- , 1964. 
4. *'Ml . '•- •• '•*--» :-c Ia*"Pd i m p e c u n i o u s Ov .1/ *n 'rr,, * 'our*. J.tv'S 
Coun*-. tr.ct '•-'•• t *>' «• ,'^y * - ti-i ,i" sc * '*--- T -'-arspo*". 
5. "),;*: ^ rv -p atmauv* n-cr s^. t<e+ort 3 ; : : ». ;• matt-* -
6. * j^«o ;fc rt^uu^eu, anc I-H-I ^^^ r b . T ivcr^ Licence Department to 
dismiss tnis c;^e betause the Accused nas r>ut received due process in the form 
of having not been tried according to tne due process required in the 
Fourteenth Amendment and as stated in the decision of Argersinger vs. Hamlin 
Sheriff, 407 U S at 48. The Court said: . 
"Serious c0nsequences a 1 s0 may resu 11 f*r0in c0n vi ct i 0ns n01 
punishable by imprisonment. Losing one's driver's license is more 
serious for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell v. 
Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971), we said: 'Once licenses are issued, as 
in petitioner's case, their continued possession may become 
essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued 
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important 
interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to 
be taken away without that procedural due process required by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.11" Id., at 539. 
The Four i ** I n. -1 .1 1 i I II IU I t i l "it d 1t i of 
America states: 
Section : persons : x naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce an> "-.*. * :'?• shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of tne United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to a - .--•;.' *."*:'" J'!J V isdiction the equal protection 
of thr •» • -
.n the Accused's *,a.se. t^e Utah State Driver's License Division has 
suspended t ^ Accused's driver's license ("privilege") without benefit of due 
process ! trial) hearing or any other Constitutional guarantees. 
lf» addition, the Accused has been ordered to put up a bond of $1,025.00, 
a tax, in order to conduct his affairs, even though there is no proof that the 
Accused is a threat or potential danger to himself, to the public, or to their 
p^ooe^ty 
This procedure is not valid because it denies due process according to 
Constitutional protections and guarantees in the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh 
Amendments 
The procedure of the Driver's License Division violates Artieie 9, 
Paragraph 3. The State may not pass a Bill of Attainder or Bill of Pains as 
described in Chapter 1?, T:tle 4], u.C.A. 
Therefore the AC« i-en p>rK^ *l •-.* - •-.. ^  . ^ U i t J . 
DATED tris rj. . - A,;; ,** -39. 
Respectfully Suomittea, 
DON R. KYNASTON ~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to oefore m u. .^  Joy of August lyby. 
NKVA 
K- "ommission Expires: 
DON R. KYNASTON 
512 North 750 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
BOUNTIFUL CITY 
s • ' • 
1301 1 f I !</'! NAS 1 01 1, 
Defendant 
ADDENDUM PAT* ;
 J ::i 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SAI T i Ar 
KYNASTON, 
; 3 n P ] 1 Pi fii f Ppf 11 "i 0 nP r 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, 
Respondei it. 
-n-rr pr U T A U 
I l.^ C *-* 
DOCKETING STATEMEN" 
COI IRT OF APP^a1 " \" 
1 r ial Court: No 9022886 
--------00O00-
A J u r i s d i c t i o n a l Statement: 
A. 1 h a t t h i s Ap p e a 1 i s f r o m a F i n a 1 Judgment o: bountiful I:: y 
Coi n t , S If lai I ; . .- • ' . •.• •• ''.. • • 
1 "I I la t Dot i R. K y n a s t o n was s t o p p e d i n B o u n t i f u l C ^ t y , 4H0 
N o r t h an id a p p r o x i m a t e l y 500 E a s t a t a p p r o x i m a t e ! v ; . 45 : 
• . 2 I I i. \ I Il I, i" i ii ig i ; -v 
a l c o h o ' ^ l
 ; • •" 
3. That Kynaston was ci ted for driving on suspension, w rth bald 
.- '"•• t i r es „ de fecti te e q i i i p r n e i i t • • ' ••••-. • "-.' • ' • •' • 
4 n iat K > naston was arrested and booked in the Davis Cot inty 
Jail ha\ ing two outstanding bencl i warrants issued by the 
• -
:
 \' S a l t I  all .• =! C i t j C ::H n t s . • . . .• • '. •• .• ' : •: . .• 
D T l n a + +• In •? c A n n a n i f O ^ r\r> rs * i r\vn4 r\v> Q-F f" h P POIIY* ! " ^ FtH iH'f 
Appeals dated October .-;. >9r grantinc ei i ter locatory Appeal 
ai id t:::l iat t l i is
 ( , ( 3 a 
under R u 1 e 5 4 ( b ) , U t a I i R u "I e s o f" C it \ i I F ' i o c e d u i e I I i a t 
Johnson found Kynaston g u i l t ) ' of" dr iv ing oi i suspense;. _...« 
• • • .. • iiir i i i ig oi i ba I! ::! t i i i es -. •,; " '' •' 
'• 2 This Appea I is made because Kynaston1 s civil and constitutional 
rights *.**•- v-.iated during arrest, arraignment, trial and sent^c---; :• * ^ p 
B if !l o ! i c e, • J i i I i • 2 W i I c o: : a i i e s t i i i g ::) f ' f ii c e i a i i d 1: ; 
S - - *- Johnson who e r ro red in sever a 1 ways, 
3 ' n e ate of the a r r e s t was Ji i l y 7 1990 The date of arra ignment 
w . 9 0. I I i e ill a !:: e s o 1 " 11 i e 11 i a I  s \ / e) e \ u g u s I: 2 8, 19 9 0 a i i d S e p t e m b e r 
1 1 , 1990, The date o f the Not ice of Appeal was October 10, 1:990 
,.'.-" ' 4 ' I he statement of f a c t i n a? id issue are the f o l l o w i n g : 
APPELLAN I Doi i R I ',} r lastoi i was s topped ::)i i 1 00 II Ic i til i appi ox imate Ih a i: 500 
E a s t on. J u l y 7 , 1990 a t abou t 11:30 p.m. Arrest ing Off icer Jul ie W ilcox to ld 
Kynaston that he was stopped for e r ra t i c driv ing, having a hunch that Kynaston 
f ii it: t I  i e p r o f ii II e o 1 ' a d i u i i k , w h ii c I t w a s i i o It: It: i i i e 
WTxcx asked for vehicle registration and driver's license. Kynaston 
aske-: wiidt tl »e probable cause was, Wilcox said she did not need probable 
C .; ., i - • 
V^cox called and checked for records. Kynaston was found to be driv ing 
on suspension .ino that t in boierh warrants were oi i file Kynaston was arrested 
a n d h a n d c u f" t e 11 j r I 11 | I 111 1111" | 11 11II i «11 \ i i t II m o u 1: II I ; r i a s t o i i b e i n g g ii v e i i I  i i s 
r i g h t . 
["he vehic le in wh ' . * . - ; - - - .,.,., ^ „_- . Tivsr-or 
and vs i thout a •! t h Amendment ! . : • - ^ 
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and was released on $1,250.00 bail bond. 
On July 23, 1990, Don Kynaston appeared in Bountiful City Court for 
arraignment and was arraigned by S. Mark Johnson without counsel, who claimed 
statutory jurisdiction. Johnson determined that driving on suspension was a 
crime and that this action was a criminal action. 
Kynaston was charged with violating Bountiful Traffic Code 41-2-136 and 
41-6-150, a Civil Statute, mysteriously now becoming a criminal action. S. 
Mark Johnson violated Kynaston's rights by entering a plea for the Accused and 
by not allowing the Accused to make a third choice, a demure, making the 
arraignment null and void. 
It is not the prerogative of any Court or Judge to assume anything. 
Court must rely on facts or testimony before any ruling, and is clearly 
forbidden by law to assume anything to be fact before moving forward to set 
trial or any other procedure. 
On July 30, 1990, the Accused sent a letter to S. Mark Johnson asking the 
Court to protect Don R. Kynaston's rights. No answer was received from the 
court. Refer to letter marked #1. 
On August 2, 1990, the Accused also sent S. Mark Johnson a second letter 
demanding that the rights of the Accused be protected sua sponte and asked 
that the jurisdiction of the City be proved by producing a corpus delicti, 
someone who could testify that Don R. Kynaston had injured or damaged them, as 
must be done in a criminal trial. See letter #2. 
S. Mark Johnson would not answer either of these letters. The Accused 
submitted an Affidavit of Prejudice. The Court proceeded with the trial even 
after the Accused objected to the trial because Don R. Kynaston had been 
denied due process and that S. Mark Johnson was prejudice in past trials. See 
Affidavit of Prejudice. 
3 
The trial proceeded with testimony from Officer Julie Wilcox that the 
Accused appeared to be drunk. She testified that he was not. Again Officer 
Wilcox testified that she did not need probable cause to stop me. 
The truth of the facts are that Appellant was driving and swerving to 
miss chuck holes and sprinklers that were shooting out into the streets, and 
there were no other cars on 400 North at that time. 
The Court found Don R. Kynaston guilty and sentenced him to thirty (30) 
days in the County Jail for driving on suspension and two (2) days for driving 
on bald tires. 
The trial was unlawful and in error because of the following issues on 
record: 
A. The Accused was denied due process in that the City did not 
produce a corpus delicti or a contract or that the Accused was a 
franchised individual or a corporation required to obey every 
letter, word, sentence of the state statute. 
B. The Accused was not represented at any time at arraignment or 
during trial or sentencing by counsel and was not asked if he 
wanted counsel. 
The Bountiful Circuit Court lost true jurisdiction by repeatedly denying 
the Appellant's CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, whiqh were already secured by the Utah 
and U.S. Constitutions. The Appellant's rights denied included Right to 
Counsel of Choice, Sua Sponte, Right of Discovery, Right of the Jury to decide 
matters of Law and Fact, and the Right of Proper time for defense to make 
objections. 
"We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has 
been denied the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. This holding is applicable to all criminal prosecutions, 
including prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. The 
denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of 
a jail sentence. (Argersinger vs. Hamlin Sheriff) 
4 
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise 
infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury. 
"Nor shall be compelled in any case to be a witness against 
himself." (Fifth Amendment, United States Constitution) 
The Appellant's right has been violated inasmuch as the alleged crime, 
although a misdemeanor, can be classified as being an infamous crime, by 
definition, due to the nature of the punishment the accused has the right to 
assist the Government to proceed against him by the way of a Grand Jury 
Indictment and not by information only. 
"It is not the character of the crime but the nature of the 
punishment which renders the crime infamous." Weeks vs. 
U.S.C.C.A.N.Y., 216 F 292, 298 
"Whether an offense is infamous depends on the punishment which 
was imposed." U.S. vs. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433, 42 G Ct. 368, 370 
"By the revised statutes of New York the term finfamous crime1 
when used in any statute, is directed to be construed as including 
every offense punishable with death, or by imprisonment in a State 
prison, and no other." Black's Law Dictionary, pg. 446 
The Accused by his actions, which actions could be considered criminal by 
the State, has shown a deep respect for the law of the land and the State by 
exerting his rights under the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Articles to the 
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the actions taken by the Bountiful 
City are a threat to the accused and to the accused's liberty and property. 
ARGERSINGER V. HAMLIN, SHERIFF 
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA 
No. 70-5015. Argued December 6, 1971—Reargued February 28, 1972 
Decided June 12, 1972 
"The right of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the 
assistance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the Fourteenth, 
(Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335), is not governed by the 
classification of the offense or by whether or not a jury trial is 
required. No accused mav be deprived of his liberty as the result 
of any criminal prosecution, whether felony or misdemeanor, in which 
he was denied the assistance of counsel. In this case, the Supreme 
Court of Florida erred in holding that petitioner, an indigent who 
5 
was tried for an offense punishable by imprisonment up to six 
months, a $1,000 fine, or both, and given a 90-day jail sentence, 
had no right to court-appointed counsel, on the ground that the 
right extends only to trials 'for non-petty offenses punishable by 
more than six months imprisonment.'" Pp. "27-40, 236 So.2nd.442, 
reversed. 
In Powell v. Alabama and Gideon, both of which involved felony 
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can present adequately 
their own cases, much less identify and argue relevant legal questions. 
Many petty offenses will also present complex legal and factual issues 
that may not be fairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by counsel. 
Even in relatively simple cases, some defendants, because of ignorance or 
some other handicap, will be incapable of defending themselves. The 
consequences of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief period 
served under the sometimes deplorable conditions found in local jails or 
the effect of a criminal record on employability, are frequently of 
sufficient magnitude not to be casually dismissed by the label "petty." 
Serious consequences also may result from convictions not punishable 
by imprisonment. Stigma may attach to a drunken-driving conviction or a 
hit-and-run escapade. Losing one's driver's license is more serious for 
some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 
535 (1971), we said: 
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued 
possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. 
Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that 
adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the 
licenses are not to be taken away without that procedural due 
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment." Ld, at 539. 
This procedure was denied to Petitioner. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that property, as well as 
life and liberty, may not be taken from a person without affording him due 
process of law. The Judge's own handbook prevents S. Mark Johnson from 
imposing a jail sentence without counsel present. 
The action taken against the Appellant is violation of his Fourth, Fifth,(*y 
Seventh, Ninth, Tenth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights. 
3. It is an unlawful abuse of procedure to use a Civil Statute as 
evidence of the law in a criminal action. 
4. The trial judge was prejudice. 
At about 11:00 a.m., September 11, 1990, Don R. Kynaston was arrested in 
Bountiful City Court and transported to Davis County Jail. The convicted was 
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booked, finger printed and photographed and was told to remove his street 
clothes and his religious garments. 
Kynaston objected and refused to do so, and was threatened by the guards 
that my garments would be removed by force if I didn't do it. Kynaston was 
pushed down by the guard in the shower room. I put on the jail clothes, but 
did not remove my garments. Kynaston asked to see the jail doctor and was 
denied by the same guard. 
Kynaston asked to receive the medication Glybizide for diabetes, and the 
medication was denied until about 9:00, causing him to become dizzy. About 
11:00 p.m., I became ill, having a very difficult time breathing, gasping for 
breath. Shortly after I developed a pain in my left arm, shoulder and neck. 
I asked the guard for help and they responded by calling the jail E.M.T. 
The E.M.T. called the paramedics for assistance. The paramedics called the 
Lakeview Emergency Room for advice, and Don R. Kynaston was transported to 
Lakeview Emergency Room. On the way I was given morphine for pain. The 
paramedics delivered the patient Don R. Kynaston, where Dr. William T. Saddler 
attended to the patient for treatment. I was admitted to Intensive Care for 
treatment and confinement for unstable heart disease. 
The Appellant hereby moves this Court to suppress the testimony of 
Officer Julie Wilcox and reverse the Trial Court's judgment. 
Wilcox cormitted perjury by knowing she had to have probable cause and 
testified that she didn't. Officer Wilcox's stop was based on a hunch and was 
not based on articulated "objective" facts, and amounted to a seizure and 
harassment of the Defendant. The Appellant motions this Court to again 
suppress the testimony of Officer Julie Wilcox and reverse the judgment of the 
Trial Court. 
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5. The following statutes and case law are as follows: 
United States Constitution Sixth Amendment 
Article VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district 
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for 
his defence. 
Article XIV 
Section I. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United 
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Utah State Constitution 
Sec. 12 [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause 
of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in 
his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to 
have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his 
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been 
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before the final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The 
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a 
husband against his wife, nor* shall any person be twice put in 
jeopardy for the same offense. 
Argersinger v. Hamlin Sheriff (70-5015) 
Under the rule we announce today, eyery judge will know when the 
trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, 
even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented 
by counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness and gravity 
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of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent 
the accused before the trial starts. 
The run of misdemeanors will not be affected by today1s ruling. But 
in those that end up in the actual deprivation of a person's 
liberty, the accused will receive the benefit of "the guiding hand 
of counsel" so necessary when one's liberty is in jeopardy. 
Baldwin v. New York 
And, as we said in Baldwin vs. New York, 399 U.S., at 73, "the 
prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be 
viewed by the accused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may well 
result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his 
reputation." 
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no 
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as 
petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel 
at his trial. 
That is the view of the Supreme Court of Oregon, with which we 
agree. 
Stevenson v. Holzman 
It said in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 102, 458 P.2d 414, 
418: 
"We hold that no person may be deprived of his liberty who has been 
denied the assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. This holding is applicable to all criminal prosecutions, 
including prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances. The 
denial of the assistance of counsel will preclude the imposition of 
a jail sentence. 
Judge's Bench Book Check List 5, Rule 2 
There will be no jail sentence without counsel present. 
Code of Crim. Proc, Sec. 77-32-1 through 77-32-7, 
Rules of Crim. Proc, Sec. 77-35-8 
A. Inform defendant: 
(1) Constitutional right to an attorney at every stage of the 
proceedings. 
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Sandy City, Plaintiff and Respondent v. 
Randy Thorsness, Defendant and Appellant 
No. 880637-CA 
Court of Appeals of Utah 
Aug. 18, 1989 
1. Arrest - 63.5(4) 
Automobiles - 349(2) 
Officer's stop of defendant was a seizure which could be justified 
only by showing of reasonable suspicion that crime had been or was 
being committed or that he was stopped incident to traffic offense. 
U.S.C.A. Cont.Amend. 4. 
2. Automobiles - 349(6) 
Reasonable suspicion that motorist is intoxicated must be based on 
articulated "objective facts" apparent to officer and reasonable 
inferences drawn from them. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
6. There are no prior appeals in this case. 
The Appellant does not seek a new trial because he has already suffered 
severe damage to his health and loss of freedom and suffrage, monetary damage 
and defamation of his character by the action of the Bountiful City Police, 
Bountiful City Prosecutor and Bountiful City Court. 
The Appellant asks the Court to reverse the judgment in this case. 
DATED this %fi day of November, 1990. 
Respectfu1ly submi tted, 
512 North 750 E& 
Bountiful, Utah 
Pro Per 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
DOCKETING STATEMENT by Certified Mail to the Utah Court of Appeals and Russell 
Mahan, Bountiful City Prosecutor, this ^ Q ^^^-day of November, 1990. 
Don R. Kynastcm^ 
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SANDY CITY 
Cite MM 778 ?2d I 
L tah, 1984 Utah L Rev 553, 559 (' The fee 
is paid out of the award made to the com-
plainant, the Commission having no author-
ity to assess attome> s fees against the 
opposing party as an additional penalty ") 
Accordingly, we hold that the Commission 
is not statutorily authorized to make 
awards of attorney fees in addition to 
awards of compensation benefits Until 
the Commission acquires such authonza 
tion it is also powerless to "add on ' attor-
ney fees by rule See Crowther v Xatwn-
wide Mut Ins Co, 762 P2d 1119 1122 
(Utah CtAppl988) ("An administrative 
agency s authority to promulgate regula-
tions is limited to those regulations which 
are consonant with the statutory frame-
work, and neither contrary to the statute 
nor beyond its scope ') 
Wdtalso hold that the Commission erred 
in apportioning liability between the Work-
ers Compensation Fund of Utah and the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund The recent 
case of Wxcat Systems v Pellegrini 111 
P 2d 686 (Utah Ct App 1989), held that the 
1984 amendments to the Employers' Rein-
surance Fund provisions were substantive, 
not procedural or remedial, and thus did 
not apply retroactively Since Harrison's 
industrial injury occurred in 1982, the law 
in effect at that time indicates that liability 
should have been apportioned thirty-nine 
percent against the Workers' Compensa-
tion Fund and sixty-one percent against the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
We therefore reverse the order of 'Jie 
Commission, and remand the case for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opin-
ion In view of this result, we have no 
occasion to reach the ments of other issues 
raised by the parties 
Reversed and remanded 
GARFF and ORME, JJ, concur 
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SANDY CITY, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Randy THORSNESS, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 880637-CA. 
Court of Appeal* of I tah 
Aug 18, 1989 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
Circuit Court, Sandy Department Robin W 
Reese, J, of driving under the influence of 
alcohol, after entering conditional no con-
test plea, preserving appeal to challenge 
denial of pretrial motion to suppress evi-
dence from illegal traffic stop The Court 
of Appeals held that officer s stop of defen-
dant's automobile, without observation of 
suspicious behavior, was not based on artic-
ulated reasonable suspicion 
Reversed and remanded 
1. Arrest «=»63.5<4) 
Automobiles <3=>349(2) 
Officer's stop of defendant was a sei-
zure which could be justified only by show-
ing of reasonable suspicion that cnme had 
been or was being committed or that he 
was stopped incident to traffic offense 
U S C A Const Amend. 4 
2. Automobiles $=>349<6> 
Reasonable suspicion that motorist is 
intoxicated must be based on articulated 
'objective facts" apparent to officer and 
reasonable inferences drawn from them 
U S C A Const Amend 4 
3. Automobiles £=349(6) 
Absent reckless or erratic driving, de-
fendant's slower speed and failure to 
'move along immediately' at officer s re-
quest, which might have indicated innocent 
behavior as well as intoxication, was not a 
reasonable basis for officer to suspect de-
fendant was intoxicated and to stop his 
automobile U S C A Const Amend 4. 
1012 Utah 778 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
George S. Diumenti, II and D. Bruce 
Oliver, Diumenti & Lindsley, Bountiful, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Clifford W. Lark and Van Midgley, City 
Attys., Sandy, for plaintiff and respondent. 
Before JACKSON, ORME and 
GARFF, JJ. 
PER CURIAM: 
Defendant was convicted cf driving un-
der the influence of alcohol. He appeals 
after entering a conditional no contest plea 
to the offense. His plea was conditional in 
order to preserve this appeal challenging 
the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress 
all evidence because of an illegal traffic 
stop. See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 939 
(Utah App.1988). 
On appeal, defendant argues that he was 
stopped without any reasonable suspicion 
by the officer who followed him. There-
fore, defendant claims, his stop was illegal 
and the subsequent evidence resulting in 
his conviction should have been suppressed. 
We agree with defendant that his stop was 
not based upon any articulated reasonable 
suspicion that a crime had been committed 
and, therefore, we reverse the conviction. 
State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 
1988). 
The evidence surrounding defendant's 
stop and arrest for DUI in the early morn-
ing hours of August 6, 1988, is basically 
undisputed. Wre view that evidence in a 
light most favorable to the trial court's 
ruling on the suppression motion. Officer 
Pingree stopped to assist a motorist whose 
car was stranded in the outside lane of a 
four-lane street at 1:30 a.m. The officer's 
car, with lights flashing, blocked that out-
side lane. Driving by the scene in the 
same direction, defendant pulled around 
the officer's vehicle and stopped his car to 
observe the activity of the officer and the 
jar's occupants. When waved on by Offi-
cer Pingree, defendant hesitated momenta-
rily, then pulled away at a "slow rate of 
speed" and drove on down the street. 
There was no other traffic in the area at 
that early morning hour. 
After he concluded his assistance with 
the stranded car, Officer Pingree deter-
mined to pursue defendant's car. He 
caught up with defendant and followed him 
for several blocks. Officer Pingree did not 
observe any suspicious or exceptionable 
driving behavior, or traffic violations. 
However, he noted that defendant drove 
slowly in the inside lane, twenty miles per 
hour in a forty-mile-per-hour zone. Defen-
dant did not commit any traffic violations 
and traffic was not impeded as there was 
none in the area at that hour. After sever-
al blocks, the officer activated his emergen-
cy lights, and pulled defendant off to the 
side of the road. 
[1,2] There is no question that the po-
lice officer's stop of defendant was a "sei-
zure" subject to the fourth amendment of 
the United States Constitution. Therefore, 
it can be justified only upon a showing of 
reasonable suspicion that defendant had 
committed or was committing a crime or 
that he was stopped incident to a traffic 
offense. Sierra at 975. In making that 
determination, we ask whether from the 
facts apparent to the officer and the rea-
sonable inferences drawn therefrom, he 
would reasonably suspect that defendant 
was intoxicated as he drove down the 
street. State v. Bavi, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 
(Utah App.1988), and cases cited therein. 
This suspicion must be based upon articu-
lated, "objective facts" then apparent to 
the officer. Cf. State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 
506 (Utah App.1988. r 
The officer testified that he suspected 
defendant was intoxicated because at 1:30 
a.m. he drove slowly in the inside lane, and 
because he stopped alongside the officer's 
car and failed to "immediately" move on 
when signaled to do so by the officer. 
While this conduct may be indicative of a 
drunken driver when combined with other 
factors, the officer also agreed that it is 
equally consistent with the habits and con-
duct of a normal driver. There is nothing 
inherently untoward in a driver traveling 
under the speed limit or in stopping mo-
mentarily, whether out of normal curiosity 
or possibly even to observe whether assist-
ance might have been required at 1:30 in 
SANDY CITY v. THORSNESS 
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the morning with no other people or traffic 
in the area. 
[3] Defendant did not engage in reck-
less, erratic driving patterns that indicated 
a lack of vehicle control or violated a traf-
fic ordinance. While there may be a multi-
tude of factors that objectively indicate the 
intoxication of a driver we do not believe 
that the driving behavior in this case rea-
sonably supports the suspicion of drunk 
driving. Although the officer testified that 
defendant's slower driving speed and his 
failure to "move on immediately" when 
requested on a deserted street at 1:30 a.m. 
were indicia of intoxication, these facts are 
equally indicative of innocent behavior and, 
without more, do not provide a reasonable 
basis to suspect defendant of being intoxi-
cated. Cf. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 976. 
We are sensitive to the dangers posed in 
our communities by those who drive while 
intoxicated. See State v. Chancellor, 704 
P.2d 579 (Utah 1985), and cases cited there-
in. But, even so, these dangers are not 
properly alleviated by permitting traffic 
stops and arrests on the basis of evidence 
as meager as that offered in this case. 
Our decision should not deter the enforce-
ment of drunk driving laws when traffic 
stops and arrests are predicated on at least 
a reasonable, articulated suspicion that an 
accused is intoxicated. 
Reversed and remanded. 
All concur. 
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ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN, SHERIFF 
CSHTIOBARI TO THE SUPREME COUBT OP FLOBIDA 
No. 70-5013, Argued December 6, 1971~Reamied Febnmrv 28. 
1972—Decided June 12, 1972 
The tight of an indigent defendant in a criminal trial to the assist-
ance of counsel, which is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment as 
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth, Gideon y. Wain-
wright, 372 TJ. S. 335, is not governed by the classification of the 
offense or by whether or not a jury trial is required. No accused, 
may be deprived of his liberty as the result of any criminal prose-, 
cation, whether feiony or misdemeanor, in which he was denied 
die assistance QI counsel, in una case, tae Supreme Court of 
Florida erred in holding that petitioner, an indigent who was tried 
for an offense punishable by imprisonmrnt up to six months, a 
SltQQQ fine, or both, and given a 90-day jail sentence, had no right 
to court-appointed counsel, on the ground that the right ertends 
only to triais "for non-oetty offm« prnwhable bv more than six 
months imprisonment." Pp. 27-40, 
236 So. 2d 442, reversed 
Dotraus, J., delivered the opinion of the Cotnt, in which Brac?-
3fA2f, SITWART, W H H I , MARSHALL, and BLAOorra", JJ., joined. 
BRSNHAX, J., filed & concurring opinion, in which DOUGLAS and 
SrrwrAST, JJ-, joined, pott, p. 40. Btnjcra, C. Jn filed an opinion 
concurring in the result, post, p. 41. POWELL, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in the result, in which RSHNQUIST, J., joined, post, p. 44. 
Bruce S. Rogow argued the cause for petitioner on the 
reargument and / . Michael Shea argued the cause pro 
hoc vice on the original argument. With them on the 
brief was P. A. Hubbart.. 
George R. Georgiefi, Assistant Attorney General of 
Florida-, reargued the cause for respondent. With him 
on the brief were Robert L, Shewn, Attorney General, 
and Raymond L. Marky, Assistant Attorney General, 
joined by the Attorneys General for their respective 
States as follows: Gary K. Nelson of Arizona, Arthur K. 
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Bolton of Georgia, W. Anthony Park of Idaho, Jack P. 
F. Gremillion of Louisiana, James S. Erwin of Maine, 
Robert L. Woodahl of Montana, Robert List of Nevada, 
Robert Morgan of North Carolina, Helgi Johanneson of 
North Dakota, and Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina. 
Solicitor General Griswold argued the cause for the 
United States as amicus curiae on the reargument urging 
reversal. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney 
General Petersen, Deputy Solicitor General Greenawalt, 
Harry R. Sachse, Beatrice Rosenberg, and Sidney M. 
Glazer. 
Briefs of amid curiae urging reversal were filed by 
William E. Hellerstein for the Legal Aid Society of New 
York, and^ by Marshall J. Hartman for the National Legal 
Aid and Defender Association. 
Lauren Beasley, Chief Assistant Attorney General of 
Utah, filed a brief for the Attorney General of Utah as 
amicus curiae urging affirmance. 
Briefs of amid curiae were filed by John E. Havelock, 
Attorney General, for the State of Alaska, and by Andrew 
P. Miller, Attorney General, and Vann H. Lefcoe, Assist-
ant Attorney General, for the Commonwealth of Virginia. 
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
Petitioner, an indigent, was charged in Florida with 
carrying a concealed weapon, an offense punishable by im-
prisonment up to six months, a $1,000 fine, or both. The 
trial was to a judge, and petitioner was unrepresented by 
counsel He was sentenced to serve 90 days in jail, and 
brought this habeas corpus action in the Florida Supreme 
Court, alleging that, being deprived of his right to counsel, 
he was unable as an indigent layman properly to raise and 
present to the trial court good and sufficient defenses to 
the charge for which he stands convicted. The Florida 
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Supreme Court by a four-to-three decision, in ruling on 
the right to counsel, followed the line we marked out in 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 TJ. S. 145, 159, as respects the 
right to trial by jury and held that the right to court-
appointed counsel extends only to trials "for non-petty 
offenses punishable by more than six months imprison-
ment." 236 So. 2d 442, 443.1 
The case is here on a petition for certiorari, which 
we granted. 401 U. S. 908. We reverse. 
The Sixth Amendment, which in enumerated situations 
€ has been made applicable to the States by reason of the 
Fourteenth Amendment/see Duncan v. Louisiana, supra; 
Washington v. Texas, 388 TJ. S. 14; Klopfer v. North 
Carolina, 386 U. S. 213; Pointer v. Texas, 380 TJ. S. 400; 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 TJ. S. 335; and In re Oliver, 
333 TJ. S. 257), provides specified standards for "all 
criminal prosecutions." 
1
 For a survey of the opinions of judges, prosecutors, and defenders 
concerning the right to counsel of persons charged with misde-
meanors, see 1 L. SUverstein, Defense of the Poor in Cnminal Cases 
in American State Courts 127-135 (1965). 
A review of federal and state decisions following Gideon is con-
tained in Comment, Eight to Counsel: The Impact of Gideon v. 
Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 Creighton L. Rev. 103 (1970). 
Twelve States provide counsel for indigents accused of "serious 
crime" in the misdemeanor category. Id., at 119-124. 
Nineteen States provide for the appointment of counsel in most 
misdemeanor cases. Id., at 124-133. One of these is Oregon, whose 
Supreme Court said in Stevenson v. Holzman, 254 Ore. 94, 100-
101, 458 P. 2d 414, 418. "If our objective is to insure a fair trial 
in every criminal prosecution the need for counsel is not deter-
mined by the seriousness of the crime. The assistance of counsel 
wiii best avoid conviction of the innocent—an objective as in> 
portant m tne municipal court as in a court of general jurisdiction." 
Uaiilorma'a requirement extends to traffic violations. Blake v. 
'Muma-pal Court, 242 Cai. App. 2d 731, 51 Cal. Rptr. 771. 
Overall, 31 States have now extended the right to defendants 
charged with crimes less serious than felonies. Comment, Right 
to Counsel, supra, at 134. 
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One is the requirement of a "public trial." In re 
Oliver, supra, held that the right to a "public trial" 
was applicable to a state proceeding even though only 
a 60-day sentence was involved. 333 U. S., at 272. 
Another guarantee is the right to be informed of the 
nature and cause of the accusation. Still another, the 
right of confrontation. Pointer v. Texas, supra. And 
another, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in 
one's favor. Washington v. Texas, supra. We .have 
never limited these rights to felonies * or to lesser but 
serious offenses. 
In Washington v. Texas, supra, we said, "We have 
held that due process requires that the accused have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense, that he be 
confronted with the witnesses against him, and that he 
have the right to a speedy and public trial." 388 U. S., 
at 18. Respecting the right to a speedy and public 
trial, the right ' to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses, the right to compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses, it was recently stated, "It is simply 
not arguable, nor has any court ever held, that the trial 
of a petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice 
to the accused of the charges, or that in such cases the 
defendant has no right to confront his accusers or to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf." 
Junker, The Eight to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 
43 Wash. L. Rev. 685, 705 (1968). 
.District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U. S. 617, illus-
trates the point. There, the offense was engaging with-
out a license in the business of dealing in second-hand 
property, an offense punishable by a fine of $300 or 
imprisonment for not more than 90 days. The Court 
held that the offense was a "petty" one and could be 
tried without a jury. But the conviction was reversed 
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and a new trial ordered, because the trial court had preju-
dicially restricted the right of cross-examination, a right 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. 
The right to trial by jury, also guaranteed by the 
Sixth Amendment by reason of the Fourteenth, was 
limited by Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, to trials where 
the potential punishment was imprisonment for six 
months or more. But, as the various opinions in Bald-
win v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, make plain, the right to 
trial by jury has a different genealogy and is brigaded 
with a system of trial to a judge alone. As stated in 
Duncan: 
"Providing an accused with the right to be tried 
by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safe-
guard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor 
and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. 
If the defendant preferred the common-sense judg-
ment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps 
less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he 
was to have it. Beyond this, the jury trial provi-
sions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect 
a fundamental decision about the exercise of offi-
cial power—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers 
over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge 
or to a group of judges. Fear of unchecked power, 
so typical of our State and Federal Governments in 
other respects, found expression in the criminal law 
in this insistence upon community participation in 
the determination of guilt or innocence. The deep 
commitment of the Nation to the right of jury trial 
in serious criminal cases as a defense against arbi-
trary law enforcement qualifies for protection uuclcr 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, and must therefore be respected by the 
States." 391 U. S„ at 156. 
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While there is historical support for limiting the 
"deep commitment" to trial by jury to "serious crim-
inal cases,"2 there is no such support for a similar limita-
tion on the right to assistance of counsel: 
"Originally, in England, a person charged with 
treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, 
except in respect of legal questions which the ac-
cused himself might suggest. At the same time 
parties in civil cases and persons accused of mis-
demeanors were entitled to the full assistance of 
counsel. . . . 
• • • • « 
"[It] appears that in at least twelve of the 
thirteen colonies the rule of the English com-
mon law, in the respect now under considera-
tion, had been definitely rejected and the right 
to counsel fuHy recognized in all criminal prosecu-
tions, save that in one or two instances the right 
was limited to capital offenses or to the more serious 
crimes . . . ." Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45., 60, 
64r-65. 
The Sixth Amendment thus extended the right to 
counsel bevond its enmmon-kw dimensions. But there 
is nothing in the language of the Amendment, its history, 
or in the decisions of this Court, to indicate that it was 
intended to embody a retraction of the right in petty 
offenses wherein the common law previously did require 
that counsel be provided. , See James v. Headley, 410 
F. 2d 325, 331-332, n. 9. 
We reject, therefore, the premise that since prosecu-
tions for crimes punishable by imprisonment for less than 
'See Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the 
Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917,980-
982 (1926); James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d 325, 331. Cf..Kaye, Petty 
Offenders Have No Peers!, 26 T7. Chi. L. Rev. 245 (1959). 
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six months may be tried without a jury, they may also 
be tried without a lawyer. 
The assistance of counsel is often a reauisite to the 
very existence of a fair triaL The Court in PoweU v. 
Alabama, supra, at 68-69—a capital case—said: 
"The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of 
little avail if it.did not comprehend the right to be 
heard by counsel Even the intelligent and edu-
cated layman has small and sometimes no skill in 
the science of law. If charged with crime, he is 
incapable, generally, of determining for himself 
whether the indictment is good or bad. He is un-
familiar with the rules of evidence. Left without 
the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without 
a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent 
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or other-
wise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and 
knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though he have a perfect one. He requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step in the pro-
ceedings against him. Without it, though he be 
not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction be-
cause he does not know how to establish his inno-
cence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how 
much more True is it of the ignorant and illiterate, 
or those of feeble intellect." 
In Gideon v. Wavnwrigkt, wpra (overruling Betts v. 
Brady, 316 U. S. 455), we dealt with a felony trial. 
But we did not so limit the need of the accused for a 
lawyer. We said: 
"Tlln our adversary - system of criminal justice, 
any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire 
a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless coun-
sel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an 
obvious truth. Governments, both state and fed-
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eral, quite properly spend vast sums of money to 
establish machinery to try defendants accused of 
crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere deemed 
essential to protect the public's interest in an or-
deriy society. Similarly, there are few defendants 
charged with crime, few indeed, who fail to hire 
the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present 
their defenses. That government hires lawyers to 
prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of 
the widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts 
are necessities, not luxuries. The right of one 
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed 
fundamental and essential to fair trials in some 
countries, but it is in ours. From the very begin-
ning, our state and national constitutions and laws 
have laid great emphasis on procedural and sub-
stantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials be-
fore impartial tribunals in which every defendant 
stands equal before the law. This noble ideal can-
not be realized if the poor man charged with crime 
has to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist 
him » 372 TT. S.. at 344.' 
Both Powell and Gideon involved felonies. But their 
rationale has relevance to any criminal trial, where an 
accused is deprived of his liberty. Powell and Gideon 
suggest that there are certain fundamental rights appli-
cable to all such criminal prosecutions, even those, such 
• See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 TJ. S. 458, 462-463: 
"[The Sixth Amendment] embodies a realistic recognition of the 
obvious truth that the average defendant does not have the pro-
fessional legal skill to protect himself when brought before a tri-
bunal with power to take his life or liberty, wherein the prosecution 
is [re] presented by experienced and learned counsel. That- which is 
simple, orderly and necessary to the lawyer, to the untrained layman 
may appear intricate, complex and mysterious." 
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as In re Oliver, supra, where the penalty is 60 days' 
imprisonment: 
"A person's right to reasonable notice of a charge 
against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his 
defense—a right to his day in court—are basic in 
our system of jurisprudence; and these rights in-
clude, as a minimum, a right to examine the wit-
nesses against him, to offer testimony, and to be 
rrprpwnreil hy rf»,<n*t>l» 333 TT S at 973 (ATTI-
phasis supplied). 
The requirement of counsel may well be necessary 
for a fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution. We 
are by no means convinced that legal and constitutional 
questions involved in a case that actually leads to im-
prisonment even for a brief period axe any less complex 
than when a person can be sent off for six months or more. 
See, e. g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U. S. 514; Thompson v. 
Louisville, 362 U. S. 199; Skuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 
382 U. S. 87. 
The trial of vagrancy cases is illustrative. While only 
brief sentences of imprisonment may be imposed, the 
cases often bristle with thorny constitutional questions. 
See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U. S. 156. 
In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1, dealt with juvenile de-
linquency and an offense which, if committed by an 
adult, would have carried a fine of $5 to $50 or impris-
onment in jail for not more than two months (id., at 29), 
but which when committed by a juvenile might lead 
to his detention in a'state institution until he reached 
the age of 21. Id., at 36-37. We said (id., at 36) that 
"[t]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope 
with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the 
facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to 
ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and 
submit it. The child 'requires the guiding hand of coun-
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sel at every step in the proceedings against him,' " citing 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S., at 69. The premise of 
Gault is that even in prosecutions for offenses less serious 
than felonies, a fair trial may require the presence of a 
lawyer. 
Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of 
the guilty plea, a problem which looms large in misde-
meanor as well as in felony cases. Counsel is needed so 
that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so 
that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or 
prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution. 
In addition, the volume of misdemeanor cases,4 far 
greater in number than felony prosecutions, may create 
an obsession for speedy dispositions, regardless of the fair-
ness of the result. The Report by the President's Com-
mission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 128 
(1967), states: 
'Tor example, until legislation last year increased 
the number of judges, the District of Columbia 
Court of General Sessions had four judges to process 
the preliminary stages of more than 1,500 felony 
cases, 7,500 serious misdemeanor cases, and 38,000 
petty offenses and an equal number of traffic of-
fenses per year. An inevitable consequence of 
volume that large is the almost total preoccupa-
4
 In 1965, 314,000 defendants were charged with felonies in state 
courts, and 24,000 were charged with felonies in federal courts. 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
Justice, Task Force Report: The Courts 55 (1967). Exclusive of 
traffic offenses, however, it is estimated that there are annually 
between four and five million court cases involving misdemeanors. 
Ibid. And, while there are no authoritative figures, extrapolations 
indicate that there are probably between 403 and 50 million traffic 
offenses each year. Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right 
to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1261 (1970). 
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tion in such a court with the movement of cases. 
The calendar is long, speed often is substituted for 
care, and casually arranged out-of-court compromise 
too often is substituted for adjudication. Inade-
quate attention tends to be given to the individual 
defendant, whether in protecting his rights, sifting 
the facts at trial, deciding the social risk he pre-
sents, or determining how to deal with him after 
conviction. The frequent result is futility and fail-
ure. As Dean Edward Barrett recently observed: 
" 'Wherever the visitor looks at the system, he 
finds great numbers of defendants being processed 
by harassed and overworked officials. Police have 
more cases than they can investigate. Prosecutors 
walk into courtrooms to try simple cases as they 
take their initial looks at the files. Defense law-
yers appear having had no more than time for 
hasty conversations with their clients. Judges face 
long calendars with the certain knowledge that their 
calendars tomorrow and the next day will be, if 
anything, longer, and so there is no choice but to 
dispose of the cases. 
" 'Suddenly it becomes clear that for most defend-
ants in the crfmina.1 process, there is scant regard, 
for them as individuals. They are numbers on 
dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent on. 
their way. The gap between the theory and the 
reality is enormous. 
" Tery little such observation of the administra-
tion of criminal justice in operation is required to 
reach the conclusion that it suffers from basic ills.' " 
That picture ia seen in almost every report. "The 
TmBripmeanor trial is characterized by insufficient and, 
frequently irresponsible preparation on the part of the 
defense, the prosecution, and the court. Everything is 
rush, TUSEL" neilerstein, Tne importance of the Mis-
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demeanor Case on Trial and Appeal, 28 The Legal Aid 
Bnei Uase 151, 152 (1970), 
There is evidence of the prejudice which results to 
misdemeanor defendants from this "assembly-line jus-
tice." One study concluded that "fmlisdemeanants rep-
resented bv attorneys are five times as likely to emerge 
from police court with all charges dismissed as are 
defendants who face similar charges without counsel/1 
American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Counsel for Mis-
demeanants, Preliminary Report 1 (1970)., 
We must conclude, therefore, that the problems as-
sociated with misdemeanor and petty5 offenses often 
5
 Title 18 U. S. C. § 1 defines a petty offense as one in which the 
penalty does not exceed imprisonment for six months, or a fine of 
not more than $500, or both. Title IS U. S. C. § 3006A (b) provides 
for the appointment of counsel for indigents in all cases "other than 
a petty offense." But, as the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
noted in James v. Headley, 410 F. 2d, at 330-331, 18 U. S. C. 
§ 3006A, which was enacted as the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, con-
tains a congressional plan for furnishing legal representation at federal 
expense for certain indigents and does not purport to cover the full 
range of constitutional rights to counsel. 
Indeed, the Conference Report on the Criminal Justice Act of 
1964 made clear the conferees' belief that the right to counsel ex-
tends to ail offenses, petty and serious alike, EL R. Conf. Rep. 
No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess* (1964). 
In that connection, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. aa_ 
ammded in 1966, provide in Rule 44 (a): f'Every defendant who 
is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel 
assigned to represent Iran at every stage of the" proceedings from 
his initial appearance before the commi^r*^ nr the court through 
appeal, unless he waives such appointment." 
The Advisory Committee note on Ruie 44 says: "Like the original 
rule the amended rule provides a right to counsel which is broader 
in two respects than that for which: compensation is provided in the 
Criminal Justice Act of 1964: 
"(1) The right extends to petty offenses to be tried in the 
district courts, and 
"(2) The right extends to defendants unable to obtain counsel _ 
for reasons other than financial." 
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require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a 
fair trial. MR. JUSTICE POWELL suggests that these 
problems are raised even in situations where there is no 
prospect of imprisonment. Post, at 48. We need not 
consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as 
regards the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not 
involved, however, for here petitioner was in fact sen-
tenced to jail. And, as we said in Baldwin v. New York, 
399 U. S., at 73. "the prospect of imprisonment for 
however short a time will seldom be viewed by the ac-
cused as a trivial or 'petty' matter and may well result 
in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his 
reputation."' 
We hold, therefore, that absent a knowing and in-
telligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any 
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or 
felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial.7 
That is the view of the Supreme Court of Oregon, with 
which we agree. It said in Stevenson v. Holzrnan, 254 
Ore. 94, 102, 458 P. 2d 414, 418: 
"We hold that no person may be deprived of his 
•See Manton v. Oliver, 324 F. Supp. 691, 696 (ED Va. 1971): 
"Any incarceration of over thirty days, more or less, will usually 
result in loss of employment, with a consequent substantial detriment 
to the defendant and his family." 
T
 We do not share MR. JTTSTXCB POWELL'S doubt that the Nation's 
legal resources are sufficient to implement the rule we announce 
today. It has been estimated that between 1,575 and 2,300 M-timc 
counsel would-be required to represent ail indigent misdemeanants, 
excluding traffic offenders. Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded 
Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 1260-1261 (1970). These 
figures are relatively insignificant when compared to the estimated 
355200 attorneys in the United States (Statistical Abstract of the 
United States 153 (1971)), a number which is projected to double 
by the year 1985. See Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enroll-
ment, 58 A. B. A. J. 146,147. Indeed, there are 18,000 new admis-
sions to the bar each year—3,500 more lawyers than arc required 
to fill the "estimated 14^ 500 average annual openings." Id., at 14S. 
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liberty who has been denied the assistance of counsel 
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, This hold-
ing is applicable to all criminal prosecutions, includ-
ing prosecutions for violations of municipal ordi-
nances. The denial of the assistance of counsel will 
preclude the imposition of a jail sentence/' * 
We do not sit; as an ombudsman to direct state courts 
how to manage their affairs but only to make clear the 
federal constitutional requirement. How crimes should 
be classified is largely a state matter.9 The fact that 
traffic charges technically fall within the category of 
"criminal prosecutions" does not necessarily mean that 
many of them will be brought into the class 10 where im-
prisonment actually occurs. 
8
 Article I, § 9, of the proposed Revised Constitution of Oregon 
provides: 
''Every person has the right to assistance of counsel in all official 
proceedings and dealings with public officers that may materially 
affect him. If he cannot afford counsel, he has the right to have 
counsel appointed for him in any case in which he may lose his 
liberty." 
9
 One partial solution to the problem of minor offenses may well 
be to remove them from the court system. The American Bar As-
sociation Special Committee on Crime Prevention and Control re-
cently recommended, inter o&x, that: 
"Regulation of various types of conduct which harm no one other 
than those involved (e. g., public drunkenness, narcotics addiction, 
vagrancy, and deviant sexual behavior) should be taken out of the 
courts. Tfle handling of these matters should be transferred to non-
judiaal entities, sucfa as detoxincation centers, narcotics treatment 
centers and social service agencies. The handling of other aon-
senous offenses, such as housing code and traffic violations, should „ 
oe transierred to specialized administrative bodies/' A3A Report,. 
iNew -Perspectives on Urban Crime hr- (1972). Such a solution, of 
course, is peculiarly within the province of state and local legislatures, 
10
 "Forty thousand traffic charges (arising out of 150,000 non-
parking traffic citations) were disposed of by court action in Seattle 
during 1964. Ite-gtudv showed, howsw, t.w, fa pnly Tihmit 1,iiff\_ 
cases was there any possibility of imprisonment as the result of a^ 
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The American Bar Association Project on Standards 
for Criminal Justice states: 
"As a matter of sound judicial administration it 
is preferable to disregard the characterization of the 
offense as felony, misdemeanor or traffic offense. 
Nor is it adequate to require the provision of defense 
services for all offenses which carry a sentence to 
jail or prison. Often, as a practical matter, such 
sentences are rarely if ever imposed for certain types 
of offenses, so that for all intents and purposes the 
punishment they carry is at most a fine. Thus, the 
standard seeks to distinguish those classes of cases 
in which there is real likelihood that incarceration 
may follow conviction from those types in which 
there is no such likelihood. It should be noted that 
the standard does not recommend a determination 
of the need for counsel in terms of the facts of each 
particular case; it draws a categorical line at those 
types of offenses for which incarceration as a punish-
ment is a practical possibility." Providing Defense 
Services 40 (Approved Draft 1968). 
traffic conviction. In onlv thrce.Jrinds--.nf- cases was the accused 
exposed to any danger of imprisonment: (1) where the offense 
Jcnafgea was nit-and-run, reciciess or drunken driving; or (2) wher^ " 
jay aaditiSBF^ranic violation was charged against an individual" 
subject to a suspended sentence for a previous violation: or 
(Sy'^n^l^wnaTev^nBe^Sense^na^^^S'e convicted individuaT 
waanngfllA m p»^y"T5?^5r"mipose<l." Junker. The Eight to Coun-
sel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 Wash. L. Rev, 885, 711 (196£ ~ 
Of the 1,288,975 people convicted by the Uty of iNew York in 
1970 for traffic infractions such as jaywalking and speeding, only 
24 were fined and imprisoned, given suspended sentences, or jailed. 
Criminal Court of the City of New York Annual Report 11 (1970). 
Of the 19,187 convicted of more serious traffic offenses, such as 
driving under the influence, reckless driving, and leaving the scene 
of an accident, 404 (2.1%) were subject to some form of imprison-
ment. Ibid. 
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Under the rule we announce today, every judge will 
J<;-nnw whpn t.h<» trial of a misdemeanor starts that no 
•irpppgnnment maybe imposed, even though local law 
permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel?* 
He will nave a measure oi the seriousness and gravity^ 
oi the offeiiSKi alld (JmrHfUrB kIMw when to name a lawyer 
to represent the accused before the trial starts. 
The run oi misdemeanors will not be anected by 
today's ruling. But in those that end up in the actual 
deprivation of a person's liberty, the accused will receive 
the benefit of "the guiding hand of counsel" so necessary 
when one's liberty is in jeopardy. 
Reversed. 
MB. JUSTICE BHENKAN, with whom Ms. JUSTICE 
DOUGLAS and Ma. JUSTICE STEWART join, concurring. 
I join the opinion of the Court and add only an 
observation upon its discussion of legal resources, ante, 
at 37 n. 7. Law students as well as practicing attorneys 
may provide an important source of legal representation 
for the indigent. The Council on Legal Education for 
Professional Responsibility (CLEPR) informs us that 
more than 125 of the country's 147 accredited law schools 
have established clinical programs in which faculty-
supervised students aid clients in a variety of civil and 
criminal matters.* CLEPR Newsletter, May 1972, p. 2. 
These programs supplement practice rules enacted in 
38 States authorizing students to practice law under 
prescribed conditions. Ibid, Like the American Bar 
Association's Model Student Practice Rule (1969), most 
of these regulations permit students to make supervised 
*A total of 57 law schools have also established clinical programs 
in corrections, where law students, under faculty supervision, aid 
prisoners in the preparation of petitions for post-conviction relief. 
CLEPR Newsletter, May 1972, p. 3. See United'States v. Simpson, 
141 U. S. App. D. C. 8, 15-16, 436 F. 2d 162, 169-170 (1970). 
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court appearances as defense counsel in criminal cases. 
CLEPR, State Rules Permitting the Student Practice of 
Law: Comparisons and Comments 13 (1971). Given the 
huge increase in law school enrollments over the past 
few years, see Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School En-
rollment, 58 A. B. A. J. 146 (1972), I think it plain that 
law students can be expected to make a significant con-
tribution, quantitatively and qualitatively, to the repre-
sentation of the poor in many areas, including cases 
reached by today's decision. 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BUBGEB, concurring in the result. 
I agree with much of the analysis in the opinion of 
the Court and with Ma. JUSTICE POWELL'S appraisal 
of the problems. Were I able to confine my focus solely 
to the burden that the States will have to bear in pro-
viding counsel, I would be inclined, at this stage of 
the development of the constitutional right to counsel, 
to conclude that there is much to commend drawing 
the line at penalties in excess of six months' confinement. 
Yet several cogent factors suggest the infirmities in any 
approach that allows confinement for any period with-
out the aid of counsel at trial; any deprivation of liberty, 
is a serious matter. The issues that must be dealt with 
in a trial for a petty offense or a misdemeanor may often 
be simpler than those involved in a felony trial and 
yet oe peyond the capability of a layman, especially 
when he is opposed by a law-trained prosecutor. There . 
is little ground, therefore, to assume that a defendant, 
unaided by counsel, will be any more able adequately 
to defend himself against the lesser charges that may 
involve confinement than more serious charges. Appeal 
from a conviction after an uncounseled trial is not likely 
to be of much help to a defendant since the die is usually 
cast when judgment is entered on an uncounseled trial 
record. 
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Trial judges sitting in petty and misdemeanor cases— 
and prosecutors—should recognize exactly what will be 
required by today's decision. Because no individual can 
be imprisoned unless he is represented by counsel, the 
trial judge and the prosecutor will have to engage in 
a predictive evaluation of each case to determine whether 
there is a significant likelihood that, if the defendant 
is convicted, the trial judge will sentence him to a jail 
term. The judge can preserve the option of a jail sen-
tence only by offering counsel to any defendant unable 
to retain counsel on his own. This need to predict 
will place a new load on courts already overburdened 
and already compelled to deal with far more cases in 
one day man is reasonable and proper. Yet the pre-
diction is not one beyond the capacity of an experienced 
judge, aided as he should be by the prosecuting officer. 
As to jury cases, the latter should be prepared to inform 
tne judge as to any prior record of the accused, the . 
general nature oi the case against the accused, includ-
ing any use of violence, the severity of harm to the 
victim, the impact on the community, and the other 
factors relevant to the sentencing process. Since, the 
judge ought to have some degree of such information 
after judgment of guilt is determined, ways can be found 
in the more serious misdemeanor cases when jury trial 
is not waived to make it available to i the judge before 
trials This will not mean a full "presentence" report 
on every defendant in every case before the jury passes 
on guilt, but a prospmtor shonlH know before trial 
whether he intends to urge a jail sentence, and if he 
does he should be prepared to aid the court with the 
factual and legal basis for his view on that score. 
*In a nonjury case the prior record of the accused should not 
be made known to the trier of fact except by way of traditional 
impeachment. 
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This will mean not only that more defense counsel 
must be provided, but also additional prosecutors and 
better facilities for securing information about the ac-
cused as it bears on the probability of a decision to confine. 
The step we take today should cause no surprise to 
the legal profession. More than five years ago the pro-
fession, speaking through the American Bar Association 
in a Report on Standards Relating to Providing Defense 
Services, determined that sorietVs goal should be 
"that the system for providing counsel and facilities 
for the defense be as good as the system which society 
provides for the prosecution." American Bar Associa-
tion Project on Standards for Criminal Justice. Provid-
ing Defense Services 1 (Approved Draft 1968). The 
ABA was not addressing itelf, as we must in this case, to 
the constitutional requirement but onlv to the broad 
policy issue. Elsewhere in the Report the ABA stated 
that: 
"The fundamental premise of these standards is 
that representation by counsel is desirable in crim-
inal cases both from the viewpoint of the defendant 
and of society." Id., at 3,. 
After considering the same general factors involved in 
the issue we decide today, the ABA Report specifically 
concluded that: 
"Counsel should be provided in all criminal pro-
ceedings for offenses punishable bv loss of liberty. 
except those types of offenses for which such pun-
ishment is not likely to beimposed. regardless 
oi their denomination as felonies, misdemeanors or 
otherwise." Id., § 4.1, pp. 37-38. 
In a companion ABA Report on Standards Relating to 
the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function 
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the same basic theme appears in the positive standard 
cast in these terms: 
"Counsel for the accused is an essential component 
of the administration of criminal justice. A court 
properly constituted to hear a criminal case must 
be viewed as a tripartite entity consisting of the 
judge (and jury, where appropriate), counsel for 
the prosecution, and counsel for the accused." Id., 
at 153 (Approved Draft 1968). 
The right to counsel has historically been an evolving 
concept. The constitutional requirements with respect 
to the issue have dated in recent times from Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932), to Gideon v: Wainwright, 
372 TJ. S. 335 (1963). Part of this evolution has been 
expressed in the policy prescriptions of the legal pro-
fession itself, and the contributions of the organized 
bar and individual lawyers—such as those appointed to 
represent the indigent defendants in the Powell and 
Gideon cases—have been notable. The holding of the 
Court today may well add large new burdens on a 
profession already overtaxed, but the dynamics of the 
profession have a way of rising to the burdens placed 
on it. 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, with whom ME. JUSTICE REHN-
QUIST joins, concurring in the result. 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963), held that 
the States were required by the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to furnish counsel to all 
indigent defendants charged with felonies.1 The ques-
1
 While it is true that Mr. Justice Black's opinion for the Court 
is Gideon is not narrowly written, Mr. Justice H.irian was quick to 
suggest, in his concurring opinion, that the facts in Gideon did not 
require the Court to decide whether the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel should extend to all criminal cases. 372 TJ. S., at 
351. In opinions announced more recently, the Court has assumed 
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tion before us today is whether an indigent defendant 
convicted of an offense carrying a maximum punish-
ment of six months' imprisonment, a fine of $1,000, 
or both, and sentenced to 90 days in jail, is entitled as 
a matter of constitutional right to the assistance of ap-
pointed counsel. The broader question is whether the 
Due Process Clause requires that an indigent charged 
with a state petty offense2 be afforded the right to ap-
pointed counsel. 
In the case under review, the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida agreed that indigents charged with serious misde-
meanors were entitled to appointed counsel, but, by a 
vote of four to three, it limited that right to offenses 
punishable by more than six months' imprisonment.1 
The state court, in drawing a six-month line, followed 
the lead of this Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 
145 (1968), and in the subsequent case of Baldwin v. 
New York, 399 U. S. 66 (1970), which was decided 
shortly after the opinion below, in which the Court held 
that the due process right to a trial by jury in state crim-
inal cases was limited to cases in which the offense 
charged was punishable by more than six months' impris-
onment. It is clear that wherever the right-to-counsel 
line is to be drawn, it must be drawn so that an indigent 
that the holding of Gideon has not yet been extended to misdemeanor 
cases. See In re Gauit, 387 U. S. 1, 29 (1967); Mem-pa v. Rhay, 
389 U. S. 128, 134 (1967); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U. S. 109, 114 
(1967); Leper v. Beto, 405 U. S. 473 (1972). 
2
 As used h»wmt the term "petty offense" means any offense where 
the authorized imprisonment does not exceed six months, Baldwin 
v. New York, 399 U. S. 66, 69 (1970). It also includes all offenses 
not punishable by imprisonment, regardless of the amount of any 
fine that might be authorized. To this extent, the definition used 
herein differs from the federal statutory dehnition of "petty of-
fense," which includes offenses punishable by not more than six 
months' imprisonment or by a fine not exceeding $500. IS U. S. C. 
§1. 
• 236 So. 2d 442 (1970). 
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has a right to appointed counsel in all cases in which there 
is a due process right to a jury trial. An unskilled lav-
man may be able to defend himself in a nonjury trial 
before a judge experienced in piecing together unas-
sembled facts, but before a jury the guiding hand of. 
counsel is needed to marshal the evidence into a coher-
ent whole consistent with the best case on behalf of 
the defendant. If there is no accompanying right to 
counsel, the right to trial by jury becomes meaningless. 
Limiting the right to jury trial to cases in which the 
offense charged is punishable by more than six months' 
imprisonment does not compel the conclusion that the 
indigent's right to appointed counsel must be similarly 
restricted. The Court's opinions in Duncan, Baldwin, 
and District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 TJ. S. 617 
(1937), reveal that the jury-trial limitation has historic 
origins at common law. No such history exists to sup-
port a similar limitation of the right to counsel; to the 
contrary, at common law, the right to counsel was avail-
able in misdemeanor but not in felonv cases.4 Onlv as 
recently as Gideon has an indigent in a state trial had a 
right to appointed counsel in felony cases. Moreover, 
the interest protected by the right to have guilt or inno-
cence determined by a jury—tempering the possibly 
arbitrary and harsh exercise of prosecutorial and judicial 
powers—while important, is not as fundamental to the 
guarantee of a fair trial as is the right to counsel.8 
•See Powell •. Alabama, 2S7 TJ. S. 45, 60-51 (1932). 
' 'Dvncan v. Lomriana, 391 TJ. S. 145, 156 (1968). 
• Although we have given retroactive effect to our ruling hi 
Gideon, Pickebimer v. Wamwright, 375 TJ. S. 2 (1963), we have 
said that, "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would 
not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons con-
victed in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial." DeStefano v. Woodx, 392 U. S. 
631, 634 (1968). 
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I am unable to agree with the Supreme Court of 
Florida that an indigent defendant, charged with a petty-
offense, may in every case be afforded a fair trial with-
out the assistance of counsel. Nor nan I agree with the 
new rule of due process, today enunciated by the Court, 
that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person 
mav be imprisoned . . . unless he was represented by 
counsel at his trial." Ante, at 37. It seems to me that 
the line should not be drawn with such rigidity. 
There is a middle course, between the extremes of 
Florida's six-month rule and the Court's rule, which 
comports with the requirements of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. I would adhere to the principle of due 
process that requires fundamental fairness in criminal 
trials, a principle which I believe encompasses the right 
to counsel in petty cases whenever the assistance of 
counsel is necessary to assure a fair trial. 
I 
I am in accord with the Court that an indigent ac-
cused's need for the assistance of counsel does not mys-
teriously evaporate when he is charged with an offense 
punishable by six months or less. In Powell v. Ala-
bama1 and Gideon* both of which involved felony 
prosecutions, this Court noted that few laymen can pre-
sent adequately their own cases, much less identify and 
argue relevant legal questions. Many petty offenses will 
also present complex legal and factual issues that may 
not oe tairly tried if the defendant is not assisted by 
counseL jEven in relatively simple cases, some defend-
ants, because of ignorance or some other handicapr will 
be incapable of defending themselves. The consequences 
of a misdemeanor conviction, whether they be a brief 
period served under the sometimes deplorable con-
1
 Supra, a. 4, At 68-$9. 
•372 U.S., at 343-345. 
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ditions found in local jails or the effect of a criminal 
reword on emplovabilitv. are frequently of sufficient mag- . 
nitude not to be casually dismissed by the label "petty."9 
Serious consequences also may result from convic-
tions not punishable by imprisonment. Stigma may 
attach to a drunken-driving conviction or a hit-and-run 
escapade.10 Losing one's driver's license is more serious 
for some individuals than a brief stay in jail. In Bell 
v. Byrson, 402 U. S. 535 (1971), we said: 
"Once licenses are issued, as in petitioners case,"] 
their continued possession may become essential in j 
the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued j 
licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates j 
important interests of the licensees. In such cases 
the licenses are not to be taken away without that 
procedural due process required by the Fourteenth 
| Amendment." Id., at 539. 
When the deprivation of property rights and interests is 
of sufficient consequence." denying the assistance of< 
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending them-
selves is a denial of due process. 
'See 1 L. Silverstein, Defense of the Poor in Criminal Cases in 
American State Courts 132 (1965). 
"See James v. Seadley, 410 F. 2d 325, 334-335 (CA5 1969). 
u
 A wide range of civil disabilities may result from misdemeanor 
convictions, such as forfeiture of public office (State ex rel. Stinger 
v. Kruger, 280 Mo. 293, 217 S. W. 310 (1919)), disqualification for a 
licensed profession (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 3094 (1962) (optom-
etrists); N. C. Gen. Stat. § 93A-4.(b) (1965) (real estate brokers)), 
and loss of pension rights (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 185.18 (3) (1966) (police 
disability pension denied when injury is result of participation in 
fights, riots, civil insurrections, or while committing crime); Ind. 
Ann, Stat. § 28-4616 (1948) (teacher convicted of misdemeanor re-
sulting in imprisonment); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 53, §39323 (Supp. 
1972-1973) and §65599 (1957) (conviction of crime or misde-
meanor)). See generally Project, The Collateral Consequences of a 
Criminal Conviction, 23 Vand. L. Rev. 929 (1970). 
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This is not to say that due process requires the ap-
pointment of counsel in all petty cases, or that assess-
ment of the possible consequences of conviction is the 
sole test for the need for assistance of counsel. The 
flat six-month rule of the Florida court and the equally 
inflexible rule of the majority opinion apply to all cases 
within their defined areas regardless of circumstances. 
It is precisely because of this mechanistic application that 
I find these alternatives unsatisfactory. Due process, 
perhaps the most fundamental concept in our law, em-
bodies principles of fairness rather than immutable line 
drawing as to every aspect of a criminal trial. While 
counsel is often essential to a fair trial, this is by no 
means a universal fact. Some petty offense cases are 
complex; others are exceedingly simple.' As a justifica-
tion for furnishing counsel to indigents accused of fel-
onies, this Court noted, "That government hires lawyers 
to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire 
lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the 
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are 
necessities, not luxuries." 12 Yet government often does 
not hire lawyers to prosecute petty offenses; instead the 
arresting police officer presents the aase. W>r HOPS mem 
defendant who can afford to do so hire lawyers to defend 
petty charges. Where the possibility of a jail sen-
tence is remote and the probable fine seems small, or 
where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the costs 
oi assistance oi counsel may exceed the benefits.13 It 
is anomalous that the Court's opinion today will extend 
13
 Gideon v. Wainvmght, 372 TJ. S., at 344. 
"In petty offenses, there is much less plea negotiation than in 
serious offenses. See Report by the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge oi 
Crime in a Free Society (hereinafter Challenge) 134 (1967). Thus, 
in cases where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the assistance 
of counsel is less essential to obtain a lighter sentence. 
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the right of appointed counsel to indigent defendants in 
cases where the right to counsel would rarely be exer-
cised by nonindigent defendants. 
Indeed, one of the effects of this ruling will be to 
favor defendants classified as indigents over those not 
so classified, yet who are in low-income groups where 
engaging counsel in a minor petty-offense case would 
be a luxury the family could not affnrri. T>IP ling be-
tween indigency and assumed capacity to pay for counsel 
is necessarily somewhat arbitrary, drawn differently from 
State to State and often resulting in serious inequities to 
accused persons. The Courts new rule will accent the 
disadvantage of being barely self-sufficient economically 
A survey of state courts in which misdemeanors are 
tried showed that procedures were often informal, pre-
sided over by lay judges. Jury trials were rare, and the 
prosecution was not vigorous.14 It is as inaccurate to 
say that no defendant can obtain a fair trial without 
the assistance of counsel in such courts as it is to say 
that no defendant needs the assistance of counsel if the 
offense charged is only a petty one.18 
Deroite its overbreadth, the easiest solution would h* 
a prophylactic rule that would require the appointment 
of counsel to indigents in all criminal cases. The sim-
plicity of such a rule is appealing because it could be 
i4SEverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126. 
"Neither the Report by the President's Commission on Law 
Enforcement and Administration of Justice nor the American Bar 
Association went the route the Court- takes today. The President's 
Commission recommended that counsel be provided for criminal de-
fendants who face "a significant penalty" and at least to those who are 
in danger of "substantial loss of liberty." Challenge, ittpra, n. 13, at 
150. The American Bar Association standard would not extend the 
right to counsel to cases where "loss of liberty" is not "likely to be 
imposed," American Bar Association Project on Standards for Crim-
inal Justice, Providing Defense Services 37-40 (Approved Draft 
1968). Neither supports a new, inflexible constitutional rule. 
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applied automatically in every case, but the price of 
pursuing this easy course could be high indeed in terms 
of its adverse impact on the administration of the crimi-
nal justice systems of 50 States. This is apparent when 
one reflects on the wide variety of petty or misdemeanor 
offenses, the varying definitions thereof, and the diversity 
of penalties prescribed. The potential impact on state 
court systems is also apparent in view of the variations 
in types of courts and their jurisdictions, ranging from 
justices of the peace and part-time judges in the small 
communities to the elaborately staffed police courts 
which operate 24 hours a day in the great metropolitan 
centers. 
Th» miff flHnptPfj today does not go all the way. It 
i« TiTrntPri tn patty-offense cases in which the sentence 
is some imprisonment. The thrust of the Court's posi-
tion indicates, however, that when the decision must 
be made, the rule will be extended to ail petty-offense 
cases except perhaps the most minor traffic violations. 
If the Court rejects on constitutional grounds, as it has 
today, the exercise of any judicial discretion as to need 
for counsel if a jail sentence is imposed, one must as-
sume a similar rejection of discretion in other petty-
offense cases. It would be illogical—and without dis-
cernible support in the Constitution—to hold that no 
discretion may ever be exercised where a nominal jail 
sentence is contemplated and at the same time endorse 
the legitimacy of discretion in "non-jail" petty-offense 
cases which may result in far more serious consequences 
than a few hours or days of incarceration. 
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that 
property, as well as life and liberty, may not be taken 
from a person without affording him due process of law. 
The majority opinion suggests no constitutional basis 
for distinguishing, between .deprivations. .oQberty^ and 
property. In fact, the majority suggests no reason at 
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all for drawing this distinction. The logic it advances 
for extending the right to counsel to all cases in which 
the penalty of any imprisonment is imposed applies 
equally well to cases in which other penalties may be 
imposed. Nor does the majority deny that some "non-
jail" penalties are more serious than brief jail sentences. 
Thus, although the new rule is extended today only 
to the imprisonment category of cases, the Court's 
opinion foreshadows the adoption of a broad prophy-
lactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. No one can 
foresee the consequences of such a drastic enlargement of 
the constitutional right to free counsel. But even to-
day's decision could have a seriously adverse impact 
upon the day-to-day functioning of the aiminal justice 
system. We should be slow to fashion a new constitu-
tional rule with consequences of such unknown dimen-
sions, especially since it is supported neither by history 
nor precedent. 
n 
The majority opinion concludes that, absent a valid 
waiver, a person may not be imprisoned even for lesser 
oflenses unless he was represented by counsel at the trial. 
In simplest terms this means that under no circumstances, 
in any court in the land, may anyone be imprisoned— 
however briefly—unless he was represented by, or waived 
his right to, counsel. The opinion is disquietingly barren 
of details as to how this rule will be implemented. 
There are thousands of statutes and ordinances, which 
autnonze imprisonment for six months or less, usually 
as an alternative to a fine. These offenses include some 
of the most trivial of misdemeanors, ranging from spit-
ting on the sidewalk to certain- traffic offenses. They 
also include a variety of more serious misdemeanors. 
This broad spectrum of petty-offense cases daily floods 
the lower criminal courts. The rule laid down today 
AHGEHSINGEH v. HAMLIN 53 
25 POWELL, J., concurring in result 
will confront the judges of each of these courts 
with an awkward dilemma. If counsel is not appointed 
or toowmgjv waived, QQ sentence of imprisonment 
for any duration may be"~imposed, The judge will 
therefore be forced to decide in advance of trial— 
and without hearing the evidence—whether he will 
forgo entirely hi3 judicial discretion to impose some 
sentence of imprisonment and abandon his responsibility 
to consider the full range of punishments established 
by tne legislature. His alternatives, assuming the 
availability of counsel, will be to appoint counsel 
and retain the discretion vested in him bv law, or to 
abandon this discretion in advance and proceed without 
counsel. 
If the latter course is followed, the first victim of the 
new rule is likely to be the concept that justice re-
quires a personalized decision both as to guilt and the 
sentence. The notion that sentencing should be tai-
lored to fit the crime and the individual would have 
to be abandoned in many categories of offenses. In 
resolving the dilemma as to how to administer the 
new rule, judges will be tempted arbitrarily to divide 
petty offenses into two categories—those for which sen-
tences of imprisonment may be imposed and those in 
which no such sentence will be given regardless of the 
statutory authorization. In creating categories of of-
fenses which by law are imprisonable but for which 
he would not impose jail sentences, a judge will be 
overruling de facto the legislative determination as to 
the appropriate range of punishment for the particu-
lar offense. I t is true, as the majority notes, that there 
are some classes of imprisonable offenses for which im-
prisonment is rarely imposed. But even in these, the 
occasional imposition of such a sentence may serve a 
valuable deterrent purpose. At least the legislatures, 
and until today the courts, have viewed the threat of 
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imprisonment—even when rarely carried out—as serving
 N 
a legitimate social function. Jt> 
Tn the brief for the United States as amicus curiae, 9 
the Solicitor General suggested that some flexibility Q^A 
could be preserved through the technique of trial de novo J 
if the evidence—contrary to pretrial assumptions—jus^ 
tified a jail sentence. Presumably a mistrial would be 
declared, counsel appointed, and a new trial ordered. 
But the Solicitor General also recognized that a *pf»nnH 
trial, even with counsel, might be unfair if the prose-
cutor could make use of evidence which came out at 
the first trial when the accused was uncounseled. If 
the second trial were held before the same judge, he 
might no longer be open-minded. Finally, a second 
trial held for no other reason than to afford the judge 
an opportunity to impose a harsher sentence might ran 
afoul of the guarantee against being twice placed in 
jeopardy for the same offense.18 In all likelihood, there 
will be no second trial and certain offenses classified by 
legislatures as imprisonabie, will be treated by judges 
as unimpnsonable. 
The new rule announced today also could result in 
equal protection problems. There may well be an un-
fair and unequal treatment of individual defendants, 
depending on whether the individual judge has de-
termined in advance to leave open the option of impris-
onment. Thus, an accused indigent would be entitled 
in some courts to counsel while in other courts in the 
same jurisdiction an indigent accused of the same offense 
would have no counsel. Since the services of counsel 
may be essential to a fair trial even in cases in which 
no jail sentence is imposed, the results of this type of 
pretrial judgment could be arbitrary and discriminatory. 
"See CaUan v. TTfcon, 127 XT. S. 540 (1888);*North Carolina v. 
Pearce, 395 T7. S. 711 (1969). 
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A different type of discrimination could result in the 
typical petty-offense case where judgment in the alter-
native is prescribed: for example, "five days in jail or 
$100 fine." If a judge has predetermined that no im-
prisonment will be imposed with respect to a particular 
category of cases, the indigent who is convicted will often 
receive no meaningful sentence. The defendant who 
can pay a $100 fine, and does so,' will have responded 
to the sentence in accordance with law, whereas the 
indigent who commits the identical offense may pay 
no penalty. Nor would there be any deterrent against 
the repetition of similar offenses by indigents.17 
To avoid these equal protection problems and to pre-
serve a range of sentencing options as prescribed by 
lawr most judges are liTcwIy tn appoint cnnnspl for indi-
gents in all but the most minnr nffenses where iail 
sentences are extremely rare. It is doubtful that the 
States possess the necessary resources to meet this sud-
den expansion of the right to counsel. The Solicitor 
General, who suggested on behalf of the United States 
tae rule the Court today adopts, recognized that the 
consequences could be far reaching. In addition to the 
expense of compensating counsel, he noted that the man-
datory requirement of defense counsel will "require more 
pre-trial time of prosecutors, more courtroom time, and 
this will lead to bigger backlogs with present personnel. 
Court reporters will be needed as well as counsel, and 
they are one of our worst bottlenecks."18 
1T
 The type of penalty discussed above (involving the discretionary 
alternative of "jail or fine") presents serious problems of fairness— 
both to indigents and nonindigents and to the administration of 
justice. Cf. Tate v. Short, 401 U. S. 395 (1971). No adequate 
resolution of these inherently difficult problems has yet been found. 
The rule adopted by the Court today, depriving the lower courts of 
all discretion in such cases unless counsel is available and is appointed, 
could aggravate the problem. 
i fTr. of Oral Arg. 34-35; 
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After emphasizing that the new constitutional rule 
should not be made retroactive, the Solicitor General 
commented on the "chaos" which could result from any 
mandatory requirement of counsel in misdemeanor cases: 
"[I]f . . . this Court's decision should become fully 
applicable on the day it is announced, there could 
be a massive pileup in the state courts which do 
not now meet this standard. This would involve 
delays and frustrations which would not be a real 
contribution to the administration of justice."19 
The degree of the Solicitor General's concern is 
reflected by his admittedly unique suggestion regard-
ing the extraordinary demand for counsel which 
would result from the new rule. Recognizing implicitly 
that, in many sections of the country, there simply will 
not be enough lawyers available to meet this demand 
either in the short or long term, the Solicitor General 
speculated whether "clergymen, social workers, proba-
tion officers, and other persons of that type" could be used 
"as counsel in certain types of cases involving relatively 
small sentences." " Quite apart from the practical and 
political problem of amending the laws of each of the 50 
States which require a license to practice law, it is diffi-
cult to square this suggestion with the meaning of the 
term "assistance of counsel" long recognized in our law. 
The majority's treatment of the consequences of the 
new rule which so concerned the Solicitor General is 
not reassuring. In a footnote, it is said that there are 
presently 355,200 attorneys and that the number will 
increase rapidly, doubling by 1985. This is asserted to 
be sufficient to provide the number of full-time counsel, 
estimated by one source at between 1,575 and 2,300, to 
represent all indigent misdemeanants, excluding traffic 
"/<*., at 36-37. 
*»/<*., at 39. 
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offenders. It is totally unrealistic to imply that 355,200 
lawyers axe potentially available. Thousands of these 
are not in practice, and many of those who do practice 
work for governments, corporate legal departments, or the 
Armed Services and are unavailable for criminal repre-
sentation. Of those in general practice, we have no 
indication how many are qualified to defend criminal 
cases or willing to accept assignments which may prove 
less than lucrative for most.21 
It is similarly unrealistic to suggest that implementa-
tion of the Court's new rule will require no more than 
1,575 to 2,300 "full-time" lawyers. In few communities 
are there full-time public defenders available for, or pri-
vate lawyers specializing in, petty cases. Thus, if it were 
possible at all, it would be necessary to coordinate the 
schedules of those lawyers who are willing to take an 
21
 The custom in many, if not most, localities is to appoint counsel 
on a case-by-case basis. Compensation is generally inadequate. 
Even in the federal courts under the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 
18 U. S. C. § 3006A, which provides one of the most generous com-
pensation plans, the rates for appointed counsel—$20 per hour spent 
out of court, $30 per hour of court time, subject to a maximum total 
fee of $400 for a misdemeanor case and $1,000 for a felony—are low 
by American standards. Consequently, the majority of persons 
willing to accept appointments are the young and inexperienced. 
See Cappeiletti, Part One: The Emergence of a Modern Theme, in 
Cappelletti <fe Gordley, Legal Aid: Modern Themes and Variations, 
24 Stan. L. Rev. 347, 377-378 (1972). MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN 
suggests, in his concurring opinion, that law students might provide 
an important source of legal representation. He presents no figures, 
however, as to how many students would be qualified and willing 
to undertake the responsibilities of defending indigent misdemean-
ants. Although welcome progress is being made with programs, 
supported by the American Bar Association, to enlist the involve-
ment of law students in indigent representation, the problems of 
meeting state requirements and of assuring the requisite control 
and supervision, are far from insubstantial. Moreover, the impact 
of student participation would be limited primarily to the 140 or 
less communities where these law schools are located. 
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occasional misdemeanor appointment with the crowded 
calendars of lower courts in which cases are not scheduled 
weeks in advance but instead are frequently tried the day 
after arrest. Finally, the majority's focus on aggregate 
figures ignores the heart of the problem, which is the 
distribution and availability of lawyers, especially in the 
hundreds of small localities across the country. 
Perhaps the most serious potential impact of today's 
holding will be on our already overburdened local 
courts.22 The primary cause of "assembly line" justice 
is a volume of cases far in excess of the capacity 
of the system to handle efficiently and fairly. The 
Court's rule may well exacerbate delay and con-
gestion in these courts. We are familiar with the 
common tactic of counsel of exhausting every pos-
sible legal avenue, often without due regard to its prob-
able payoff. In some cases this may be the lawyer's 
duty; in other cases it will be done for purposes of 
delay.53 The absence of direct economic impact on the 
client, plus the omnipresent ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim, frequently produces a decision to litigate 
every issue. It is likely that young lawyers, fresh out 
of law school, will receive most of the appointments in 
petty-offense cases. The admirable zeal of these law-
yers; their eagerness to make a reputation; the time 
their not yet crowded schedules permit them to devote 
to relatively minor legal problems; their desire for court-
room exposure; the availability in some cases of hourly 
fees, lucrative to the novice; and the recent con-
stitutional explosion in procedural rights for the ac-
cused—all these factors are likely to result in the stretch-
"See generally H. James, Crisis in the Courts, c. 2 (1968); 
Challenge, ntpra, n. 13, at 145-156. 
28
 See, «. g., James, swpra, n. 22, at 27-30; Schrag, On Her 
Majesty's Secret Service: Protecting the Consumer in New York 
City, 80 Yale L. J. 1529 (1971). 
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ing out of the process with consequent increased costs 
to the public and added delay and congestion in the 
courts.5* 
There is an additional problem. The ability of vari-
ous States and localities to furnish counsel varies widely. 
Even if there were adequate resources on a national 
basis, the uneven distribution of these resources—of law-
yers, of facilities, and available funding—presents the 
most acute problem. A number of state courts have 
considered the question before the Court in this case, 
and have been compelled to confront these realities. 
Many, have concluded that the indigent's right to ap-
pointed counsel does not extend to all misdemeanor 
cases. In reaching this conclusion, the state courts have 
drawn the right-to-counsel line in different places, and 
most have acknowledged that they were moved to do so, 
at least in part, by the impracticality of going further." 
J* In Cook County, Illinois, a recent study revealed that the mem-
bers of the Chicago Bar Association's Committee on the Defense 
of Prisoners who are appointed to represent indigent defendants elect 
a jury trial in 63% of their trial cases, while other appointed counsel 
and retained counsel do so in 33% and the public defender in only 15%. 
"One possible explanation for this contrast is that committee counsel, 
who are sometimes serving in part to gain experience, are more 
willing to undertake a jury trial than is an assistant public defender, 
who is very busy and very conscious of the probable extra penalty 
accruing to a defendant who loses his case before a jury." D. Oaks 
& W. Lehman, A Criminal Justice System and the Indigent 159 
(1968) (footnote omitted). 
"See Irvin v. State, 44 Ala, App. 101, 203 So. 2d 283 (1967); 
Burrage v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 53, 459 P. 2d 313 (1969); 
Cableton v. State, 243 Ark. 351, 420 S. W. 2d 534 (1967); State ex 
reL Argeninger v. Hamlin, 236 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1970); People v. 
Dupree, 42 DL 2d 249, 246 N. E. 2d 281 (1969); People v. Mailory, 
378 Men. 538, 147 N. W. 2d 66 (1967); Hendrix v. City of Seattle, 
76 Wash. 2d 142,.456 P. 2d 696 (1969), cert, denied, 397 U. S. 948 
(1970); State ex rei. PluUehack v. Department of Health and Social 
Service*, 37 Wis. 2d 713,155 N. W. 2d 549 (1968). 
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In other States, legislatures and courts through the en-
actment of laws or rules have drawn the line short of 
that adopted by the majority." These cases and stat-
utes reflect the judgment of the courts and legislatures 
of many States, which understand the problems of 
local judicial systems better than this Court, that 
the rule announced by the Court today may seriously 
overtax capabilities.27 
The papers filed in a recent petition to this Court for a 
writ of certiorari serve as an example of what today's rul-
ing will mean in some localities. In November 1971 the 
petition in Wright v. Town of Wood, No. 71-5722, was 
filed with this Court. The case, arising out of a South 
Dakota police magistrate court conviction for the mu-
nicipal offense of public intoxication, raises the same 
issues before us in this case. The Court requested that 
the town of Wood file a response. On March 8, 1972, 
a lawyer occasionally employed by the town filed with 
the clerk an affidavit explaining why the town had not 
responded. He explained that Wood, South Dakota, 
"See Hawaii Const., Art. I, § 11 (1968); Idaho Code §§ 19-851, 
19-852 (Supp. 1971); Kan. Stat. Ann. §22-4503 (Supp. 1971); Ky. 
Rule Crim. Proc. 8.04; La. Rev. Stat. § 15:141 (F) (1967); Me. Rule 
Crim. Proc. 44; Md. Rule 719b2 (a); Neb. Rev. Stat. §29-1803 
(1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 171.188, 193.140 (1969); N. Mex Stat. 
Ann. § 41-22-3 (Supp. 1971); Utah Code Ann. § 77-64-2 (Supp. 
1971); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 13, § 6503 (Supp. 1971); Va. Code Ann. 
§19.1-241.1 (Supp. 1971). 
"See TT.i«ii«i.y & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: 
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 
1, 68 (1963). Local judges interviewed by the authors concluded 
that the right to counsel should not be extended to petty cases. 
"If no such dividing line can be drawn, if the question of assigned 
counsel in misdemeanor cases resolves itself into an 'all or nothing' 
proposition, then, the thrust of their views was that limited funds 
and lawyer-manpower and the need for judicial economy dictate that 
it be 'nothing.'" (Footnote omitted.) But see State v. Borst, 278 
Minn. 388, 154 N. W. 2d 888 (1967). 
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has a population of 132, that it has no sewer or water 
system and is quite poor, that the office of the nearest 
lawyer is in a town 40 miles away, and that the town 
had decided that contesting this case would be an unwise 
allocation of its limited resources. 
Though undoubtedly smaller than most, Wood is not 
dissimilar to hundreds of communities in the United 
States with no or very few lawyers, with meager finan-
cial resources, but with the need to have some sort of 
local court system to deal with, minor offenses.28 It is 
quite common for the more numerous petty offenses in 
such towns to be tried by local courts or magistrates 
while the more serious offenses are tried in a county-
wide court located in the county seat.:9 It is undoubt-
edly true that some injustices result from the informal 
procedures of these local courts when counsel is not 
furnished; certainly counsel should be furnished to some. 
indigents in some cases. But to require that counsel be 
furnished virtually every indigent charged with an im-
prisonable offense would be a practical impossibility for 
many small town courts. The community could simply 
not enforce its own laws." 
» See Cableion v. State, 243 Ark., at 358, 420 S. W. 2d, at 538-
539: "[T]here are more justices of the peace in Arkansas than there 
are resident practicing lawyers and . . . there are counties in which 
there are no practicing lawyers. The impact of [right to counsel 
in misdemeanor cases] would seriously impair the administration of 
justice in Arkansas and impose an intolerable burden upon the legal 
profession." (Footnote omitted.) 
" See Silverstein, supra, n. 9, at 125-126. 
10
 The successful implementation of the majority';* rule would 
require state and local governments to appropriate considerable 
funds, something they have not been willing to do. Three States 
with 21% of the Nation's population provide more than 50% of all 
state appropriations for indigent defense. Note, Dollars and Sense 
of an Expanded Right to Counsel, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 1249, 12C5 
(1970). For example, in 1971 the State of Kansas spent $570,000 
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Perhaps it will be said that I give undue weight 
both to the likelihood of short-term "chaos" and to 
the possibility of long-term adverse effects on the system. 
The answer may be given that if the Constitution re-
quires the rule announced by the majority, the conse-
quences are immaterial. If I were satisfied that the 
guarantee of due process required the assistance of 
counsel in every case in which a jail sentence is imposed 
or that the only workable method of insuring justice 
is to adopt the majority's rule, I would not hesitate 
to join the Court's opinion despite my misgivings as 
to its effect upon the administration of justice. But 
in addition to the resulting problems of availability of 
counsel, of costs, and especially of intolerable delay 
in an already overburdened system, the majority's draw-
ing of a new inflexible rule may raise more Fourteenth 
Amendment problems than it resolves. Although the 
Court's opinion does not deal explicitly with any 
sentence other than deprivation of liberty however 
brief, the according of special constitutional status 
to cases where such a sentence is imposed may derogate 
from the need for counsel in other types of cases, unless 
the Court embraces an even broader prophylactic rule. 
Due process requires a fair trial in all cases. Neither the 
six-month rule approved below nor .the rule today enun-
ciated by the Court is likely to achieve this result. 
defending indigents in felony cases—up from $376,000 in 1969. 
Although the budgetary request for 1972 was 3612,000, the legislature 
has appropriated only $400,000. Brief for Appellant in James v. 
Strange, No. 71-11, decided today, post, p. 128. "In view of Amer-
ican resources the funds spent on the legal services program can only 
be regarded as trivial." Cappelletti, supra, n. 21, at 379. "Although 
the American economy is over S times the size of the British and the 
American population is almost 4 times as great, American legal aid 
expenditures are less than 2 times as high." Id., at 379 n. 210. 
ARGERSINGER v. HAMLIN 63 
25 POWELL, J., concurring in result 
m 
I would hold that the right to counsel in petty-
offense cases is not absolute but is one to be deter-
mined by the trial courts exercising a judicial dis-
cretion on a. case-by-case basis." The determination 
should be made before the accused formally pleads; 
many petty cases are resolved by guilty pleas in 
which the assistance of counsel may be required." If 
the trial court should conclude that the assistance of 
counsel is not required in any case, it should state its 
reasons so that the issue could be preserved for review. 
The trial court would then become obligated to scrutinize 
carefully the subsequent proceedings for the protection 
of the defendant. If an unrepresented defendant sought 
to enter a plea of guilty, the Court should examine 
the case against him to insure that there is admissible 
evidence tending to support the elements of the of-
fense. I&a case went to trial without defense counsel, 
th«» nnnrt should interveneri/nuiu. imccspary, '.u llimire 
that the defendant adequately brmgs oil I tlitf Lnu in 
his favor and to prevent legal issues fl'imi being uvei-
looked. Formal trial rules should not be applied strictly 
against unrepresented defendants, finally, appellate 
" I t seems to me that such an individualized rule, unlike a six-
month rule and the majority's rule, does not present equal protec-
tion problems under this Court's decisions in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 
TJ. S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 TJ. S. 353 (1963); and 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 TJ. S. 1S9 (1971). 
" See, e. q., Kate, Municipal Courts—Another Urban 111, 20 Case 
Western Reserve L. Rev. 87, 92-96 (1968). Cf. Hamilton v. Ala-
bama, 368 TJ. S. 52 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 TJ. S. 59 (1963) ; 
Sarvsy v. Mbnssippi, 340 F. 2d 263 (CA5 1965). 
Although then is less plea negotiating in petty cases, see n. 13, 
tupra, the assistance of counsel may still be needed so that the de-
fendant who is not faced with overwhelming evidence of guilt can 
make an intelligent decision whether to go to trial. 
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courts should carefully scrutinize all decisions not to 
appoint counsel and the proceedings which follow. 
It is unpossible, as well as unwise, to create a precise 
and detailed set of guidelines for judges to follow in de-
termining whether the appointment of counsel is neces-
sary to assure a fair trial. Certainly three general factors 
should be weighed. First, the court should consider the 
complexity of the offense charged. For example, charges 
of traffic law infractions would rarely present complex 
legal or factual questions, but charges that contain difficult 
intent elements or which raise collateral legal questions, 
• sucn as searcn-and-seizure prooiems, would usually be too 
complex for an unassisted layman. If the offense were 
one where the State is represented by counsel and where 
most defendants who can afford to do so obtain counsel, 
there would be a strong indication that the indigent also 
needs the assistance of counsel. 
Second, the court should consider the probable sen-
tence that will follow if a conviction is obtained. The 
,more serious the likely consequences, the greater is the 
probability that a lawyer should be appointed. As noted 
in Fart 1 above, Imprisonment is not the only serious 
consequence tne court should consider. 
i'nird, tne court should consider the individual factors 
peculiar to each case. These, of course, would be the 
most difficult to anticipate. One relevant factor would be 
the competency of the individual defendant to present his 
own case. The attitude of the community toward a par-
ticular defendant or particular incident would be another 
consideration. But there might be other reasons why a 
defendant would have a peculiar need for a lawyer which 
would compel the appointment of counsel in a case where 
the court would normally think this unnecessary. Ob-
viously, the sensitivity and diligence of individual judges 
would be crucial to the operation of a rule of fundamental 
, fairness requiring the consideration of the varying factors 
in each case. 
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Such a rule is similar in certain respects to the special-
circumstances rule applied to felony cases in Betts v. 
Brady, 316 U. S. 455 (1942), and Bute v. Illinois, 333 
U. S. 640 (1948), which this Court overruled in Gideon." 
j ^ n p *f +h* rooenna for seeking a more definitive standard 
in felony cases was the failure of many state courts to 
jive up to their responsibilities in determining on a case-
by-case basis whether counsel should De appointed. See 
the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice ilarian in (Jiaeon, 
372 U. S., at 350-351. But this Court should not assume 
that the past insensitivity of some state courts to the 
rights of defendants will continue. Certainly if the 
Court follows the course of reading rigid rules into the 
Constitution, so that the state courts will be unable to 
exercise judicial discretion within the limits of funda-
mental fairness, there is little reason to think that in-
sensitivity will abate. 
Tn ftonrlnHinir I emphasize my long-held conviction 
that the adversary system functions best and most fairly 
only when all parties arc represented by competent 
counsel. Before becoming a member ol this Lourt,~T 
participated in efforts to enlarge and extend the avail-
ability of counsel. The correct disposition of this case, 
therefore, has been a matter of considerable concern to 
me—as it has to the other members of the Court. We 
are all strongly drawn to the ideal of extending the right 
to counsel, but I differ as to two fundamentals: (i) what 
the Constitution requires, and (ii) the effect upon the 
criminal justice system, especially in the snuil'.er cities 
and the thousands of police, municipal, and justice of die 
peace courts across the country. 
The view I have expressed in this opinion would accord 
considerable discretion to the courts, and would allow the 
M I do not disagree with the overruling of Betts; I am in complete 
accord with Gideon. Betts, like Gideon, concerned the right to 
counsel in a felony case. See n. 1, supra. Neither case controls 
today's result. 
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flexibility and opportunity for adjustment which seems 
so necessary when we are imposing new doctrine on the 
lowest level of courts of 50 States. Although this view 
would not precipitate the "chaos" predicted by the Solici-
tor General as the probable result of the Courts absolutist 
rule, there would still remain serious practical problems 
resulting from the expansion of indigents' rights to coun-
sel in petty-offense cases.J4 But the according of review-
able discretion to the courts in determining when counsel 
is necessary for a fair trial, rather than mandating a com-
pletely inflexible rule, would facilitate an orderly transi-
tion to a far wider availability and use of defense counsel. 
In this process, the courts of first instance which de-
cide these cases would have to recognize a duty to consider 
the need for counsel in every case where the defendant 
faces a significant penalty. The factors mentioned above, 
and such standards or guidelines to assure fairness as 
might be prescribed in each jurisdiction by legislation or 
rule of court, should be considered where relevant. The 
goal should be, in accord with the essence of the adversary 
system, to expand as rapidly as practicable the avail-
ability of counsel so that no person accused of crime 
must stand alone if counsel is needed. 
As the proceedings in the courts below were not in 
accord with the views expressed above, I concur in the 
result of the decision in this case. 
34
 Indeed, it is recognized that many of the problems identified in 
this opinion will result from any raising of the standards as to the 
requirement of counsel. It is my view that relying upon Judicial 
discretion to assure fair trial of petty offenses not only comports 
with the Constitution but will minimize problems which otherwise 
could affect adversely the administration of criminal justice is the 
very courts which already are under the most severe strain. 
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DON R. KYNASTON 
512 North 750 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURT OF BOUNTIFUL CITY V4T< <%fo 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^' A 
ooOoo *A > 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOTION FOR DESIGNATION 
OF RECORDS 
Case No. 902286 DON R. KYNASTON, 
Appellant. 
— ooOoo — 
COMES NOW the Accused Don R. Kynaston and motions this Court for 
Designation of Records pursuant to Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
The Accused motions this Court to produce and provide to Don R. Kynaston 
all the records concerning him, to enable the Accused to perfect his appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals, concerning the Accused's Affidavit of Prejudice 
that the Accused has filed against Judge S. Mark Johnson. 
The information requested shall include all police records of stops, 
citations (Bill of Pains) and arrests of Don R. Kynaston. 
This information shall also include the records of all trials, names of 
trial judges, including pro-tem judges and all the verdicts rendered and also 
all recorded tapes of these criminal actions, and the dates and times which 
they were recorded. 
This information from the Court records shall include when the Accused 
Don R. Kynaston served jail or prison time and how much bail, bond, or fines 
he paid to the Court. This information must go back and include everything 
back for ten years. 
Also included must be all of the off-the-record conversations between 
Judge S. Mark Johnson and the City Prosecutor and between Judge S. Mark 
Johnson and the Court Clerks concerning the Accused. Also, the Accused in the 
above-numbered case motions that the city produce a Corpus Delicti, the name 
of a person or persons who suffered injury or damage in this action, that they 
be brought forth to testify against the Accused. 
These records must be delivered to the Accused Don R. Kynaston within ten 
(10) days of this Motion.. 
DATED this /f) day of September, 1990. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DON R. KYNASTON 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered^ true and correct copy of the 
MOTION FOR DESIGNATION OF RECORDS t h i s / 2 *** day of September, 1990. 
Don R. Kyna'ston / 
F I L E D 
SEP 10:930 
SHAEON MOWER, C!e-k 
Fourth Circuit Court 
Bountiful Department 
ADDENDUM PART 9 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, COUNTY OF DAVIS 
LAYTON DEPARTMENT 
BOUNTIFUL CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DON KYNASTON , 
Defendant. 
D E C I S I O N 
C i v i l No. 882003055 
The court finds that the defendant is indigent at the 
present time and is entitled to the relief as set out in 
Section 77-32-5 of the Utah Code. 
Dated this ^ ~~ day of May, 1989. 
Parley R. Baldwii 
Circuit Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to Bountiful City Prosecutor, at 745 South Main, 
Bountiful, Utah, 84010, and to Don R, Kynaston, Defendant, at 
512 North 750 East, Bountiful, Utah, 84010; postage prepaid 
this <ML^ day of May, 1989. 
^ 
Debbie L. 
Deputy Clerk 
ADDENDUM PART 10 
ABPENDOM 
Federal Fule^ of Cr imina l P rocedure 
No. 1709, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 
In that connection, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, as 
amended in 1966, provide in Rule 44 (a): "Every defendant who 
is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel 
assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from 
his initial appearance before the commissioner or the court through 
appeal, unless he waives such appointment." 
The Advisory Committee note on Rule 44 says: "Like the original 
rule the amended rule provides a right to counsel which is broader 
in two respects than that for which compensation is provided in the 
Criminal Justice Act of 1964: 
a
 (1) The right extends to petty offenses to be tried in the 
district courts, and 
"(2) The right extends to defendants unable to obtain counsel 
for reasons other than financial/9 
WILLIAM T. S A D L E R , M.D. 
P U L M O N A R Y , I N T E R N A L , A N D OCCUPATIONAL, 
MEDICI N X 
415 SOUTH MEDICAL DRIVE. SUITE C -202 
BOUNTIFUL. UTAH 8*OiO 
2 9 5 - 8 5 2 3 
ADDENDUM PART U 
September 20, 1990 
To whom it may concern: 
Re: Donald R. Kynaston 
I have attended Mr. Kynaston in Lakeview Hospital (9/11/90 thru 
9/17/90) and briefly as an outpatient following his discharge. Mr. 
Kynaston has evidence of a prior myocardial infarction (heart 
attack) on his electrocardiogram. For several reasons including 
financial constraints we were unable to complete the evaluation of 
this problem while Mr. Kynaston was hospitalized. He has requested 
that the remainder of his evaluation take place at the Salt Lake 
City Veteran1s Administration Hospital and I am attempting to 
schedule the rest of the evaluation there. 
Mr. Kynaston!s chest pains may be due to unstable heart disease. 
They are exacerbated by emotional stress and incarceration. An 
additional heart attack may prove to be disabling and might be 
fatal if it does occur. I ffeel that postponement of his jail 
sentence is warranted until his cardiac status can be fully 
defined. Please contact me if I can be of assistance in this 
matter. Best wishes. 
y-ld.Cil) 
Sincerely, 
William T. Sadler, M.D. 
WTS/ss 
^/f .<?y 
DOB 09-16-29 DL # 14294417 
Department of Public Safety 
OFFICE OF DRIVER LICENSE SERVICES 
Financial Responsibility Section 
Third Floor South 
4501 South 2700 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84119 
A D D E N D U M P A R T I? 
ORDER OF SUSPENSION 
To Become Effective Unless 
Security is Deposited or 
An Exemption is Established 
R E A D C A R E F U L L Y 
zrr -d ti 
Mr. Don R. Kynaston 
512 North 750 East 
B o u n t i f u l , Utah 84010 FILE NO. 30-11-443419 
Dear Sir or Madam: 
As a result of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on November 3 0 . 1984 
near. Bount j fy l ,Utah you have become sub ,in or 
. ,Utah you have become subject to the security requirement 
provisions of the Financial Responsibility Act, Chapter 12, Title 41, Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
Since you have not shown that you had automobile liability insurance in effect at the time of the accident, and since 
you have not exempted yourself from the security requirement provisions of the Act in any of the other ways 
permitted, the Department must now make the following Order: 
Your privilege of operating a motor vehicle upon the highways of the State of Utah is suspended as of 
June 25 , 1985 , UNLESS prior to that date you have done either of the following: 
or (1) Deposited security with the Department in the amount of $ 1 j 0 2 0 . 0 0 (2) Established an exemption from the requirement of depositing such security, or in any of the ways listed on the 
reverse side of this Order. 
Immediately after such effective date of this Order, if you have not by that time deposited such security or 
established such an exemption, you must forward to the Department (address above) all operator's and chauffeur's 
licenses evidencing your Utah driving privilege, and all Utah motor vehicle registration certificates and license plates 
in your name. If you fail to do this, you will become subject to a fine not exceeding $299.00, or imprisonment not 
exceeding six months, or both, 
This Order, if allowed to become effective, will remain in effect until (1) you have deposited the above-stated amount 
of secuirty, or (2) you have established an exemption from the requirement of depositing such security, in any of the 
ways listed on the reverse side of this Order, or (3) one year has elapsed following the effective date of the suspension 
order and evidence satisfactory to the Department is submitted to it indicating that within that period no action at law 
arising out of the accident has been instituted against you, or if so instituted, that it is no longer pending. 
DATE ORDER SIGNED: 
June 5 , 1985 DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY 
Financial Responsibility Section 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifes that, on the date below, he or she, as an employee of the Department of Public 
Safety, Financial Responsibility Section, deposited in the United States Mail at Salt Lake City, Utah, an original of 
the order to which this is affixed, in an envelope addressed to the person named in the order, at his or her last address 
as shown on the records of the Department, postage prepaid. 
June *?, 19B1) 
Date Department Employee 
SR 8 (P-25) 
Rev. 2-82 
IMPORTANT ~ SEE REVERSE SIDE 
ADDENDUM PA3RT 13 
SECOND CIRCUIT COURT 
745 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
(801)298-6153 
September 18, 1990 
Mr. Don R. Kynaston 
512 North 750 East 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Re: Case #902002886 DRIVING ON SUSPENSION 
DRIVING ON BALD TIRES 
Dear Mr. Kynaston: 
Judge Johnson has entered an order that you report at the 
Davis County Jail in Farmington, Utah at 5%00 p.m. on Friday 
the 21st day of September to begin serving your 3 0 day jail 
sentence. Please govern yourself accordingly. 
Yours truly, 
CIRCUIT COURT 
JJ^U^Th^ *?[< 
Court Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
This certifies that a true copy of the Appeal Brief has been delivered to 
Russell Mahan by Certified Mail or in person. 
DATED this / T ^ day of May, 1991. 
DON R. KYNASTOJT 
